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T HE CHECKLIST
A. CURB IMPROPER F ORUM SHOPPING
•

Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction
is appropriate for the specific case given the
jurisdiction’s connection to the alleged exposure(s),
parties, and witnesses; enforce venue and forum non
conveniens laws to transfer cases more appropriately
heard in other jurisdictions. See page 609.

B. PRIORITIZE CLAIMS OF THE TRULY SICK
•
•

Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to
bring or proceed with a claim. See page 613.
Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the
diagnosis alleging injury by determining whether the
claim was generated through a litigation screening or is
supported by a report from a physician that has been
implicated in fraudulent civil filings. See page 616.

C. A PPLY TRADITIONAL T ORT LITIGATION PROCEDURES
•
•

•

Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims.
See page 620.
Checklist Item #5: Assure discovery rules are
appropriate for each claim and defendant; if “form”
discovery is used, make sure it is appropriate and not
overly burdensome as applied in individual cases. See
page 621.
Checklist Item #6: Do not short-circuit trials. See page
622.
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D. O NLY A LLOW CLAIMS A GAINST DEFENDANTS WHERE
T HERE IS A LEGAL BASIS FOR LIABILITY
•
•
•

Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should
owe no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site,
secondhand exposure to asbestos. See page 624.
Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law
distinctions for when premises owners can be liable for
injuries to contractors’ employees. See page 626.
Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers
should not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related
hazards in external or replacement parts made, supplied,
or installed by others and affixed post-manufacture. See
page 628.

E. O NLY A LLOW A D EFENDANT TO BE H ELD LIABLE IF ITS
CONDUCT OR PRODUCT WAS A LEGAL C AUSE OF THE A LLEGED
INJURY
•
•

•
•

Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on
expert testimony and assure that materials experts rely
on actually support their claims. See page 631.
Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in
causing the alleged harm. See page 633.
Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate
product identification by dismissing cases where
product identification is not sufficient. See page 636.
Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other
asbestos-related cancers. See page 637.
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F. ASSURE J URIES CAN F ULLY C OMPENSATE D ESERVING
P LAINTIFFS WHILE PRESERVING ASSETS FOR F UTURE CLAIMANTS
•

•

•

•
•
I.

Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement
trust claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and
declare intentions to file any future claims. See page
644.
Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits
and offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to
satisfy a legal claim directed at the injury alleged in
accordance with state law. See page 647.
Checklist Item #16: Allow collateral sources to be
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for all
collateral sources that provided compensation to the
plaintiff for the alleged harm. See page 649.
Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint
and several liability rules. See page 650.
Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages
claims. See page 652.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has described the asbestos
litigation as a “crisis.”1 A hallmark of the litigation has been the
mass filing of lawsuits by plaintiffs with little or no physical
impairment and claims made by plaintiffs without reliable proof of
causation, both of which have helped force scores of defendant
companies into bankruptcy and have threatened payments to the
truly sick.2 At times, courts have fueled the litigation by taking
well-intentioned, but ill-suited, procedural shortcuts in an effort to
1

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997).
See Mark Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick
Claimants and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR
L. REV . 331 (2002); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of
the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001); Richard O. Faulk,
Dispelling the Myths of Asbestos Litigation: Solutions for Common Law
Courts, 44 S. T EX . L. R EV . 945 (2003).
2
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get out from under the avalanche of claims.3 In pushing for
efficiency, however, these courts put aside normal rules of
discovery and procedure.4 Instead of decreasing dockets, experience
has shown that these measures actually created incentives for
personal injury lawyers to file more claims.5 In recent years, courts
and legislatures in key asbestos jurisdictions that have appreciated
these unintended consequences have begun restoring fundamental
tort law principles to asbestos litigation. By doing so, they have
helped root out many of the abusive practices and claims that had
plagued the litigation. As a result, the overall asbestos litigation
environment has shown signs of improvement.6
Whether recent advances in the litigation will be lasting is a
question yet to be answered. Asbestos litigation has a way of
reinventing itself. As one legal observer explained, “the next
asbestos is always asbestos, because the litigation always moves
on.”7 Asbestos personal injury lawyers are creative in finding new
tactics to expand liability. In addition, there has been a new
migration of claims to jurisdictions where trial judges may not be
experienced in managing asbestos dockets. These judges may not be
aware of the issues, history and tactics particular to asbestos
litigation.
3

See Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of Unintended
Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline The Litigation
Have Fueled More Claims, 71 M ISS. L.J. 531 (2001).
4
See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation’s
Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent
Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM . J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247 (2000).
5
See id.
6
See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis:
The Tide Appears to Be Turning, 12 CONN . INS. L.J. 477 (2006); James A.
Henderson, Jr., Asbestos Litigation Madness: Have the States Turned a
Corner?, 3:6 MEALEY’S T ORT REFORM UPDATE 23 (Jan. 18, 2006); Patti
Waldmeir, Asbestos Litigation Declines in Face of US Legal Reforms, FIN .
T IMES, July 24, 2006, at 2; Paul Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against
Companies Sharply Decline, W ALL ST . J., Aug. 26, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter
Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply Decline].
7
See Peter Geier, ‘Sea Change’ In Asbestos Torts Is Here: New Strategies,
New Defendants Seen, NAT’ L L.J., Oct. 31, 2005, at 1 (quoting attorney Mark
Behrens).
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This article collects lessons learned from the past by courts
with experience handling asbestos claims and translates them into a
checklist of trial action items so that trial judges who may be new
to this litigation can avoid some of the more serious problems of
the past and better address the next evolution of claims.
II. A PRIMER ON THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION
A. The Number of Claims Explodes
The initial asbestos-related lawsuits were filed in the 1970s.8
By the 1980s, “what had once been a series of isolated cases turned
into a steady flow,” which continued to increase over the next
decade.9 By the early 1990s, courts and commentators recognized
that the “elephantine mass” of asbestos cases that were then being
filed created extraordinary problems.10 In 1991, the Federal Judicial
Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation called the
litigation “a disaster of major proportions.”11 The Ad Hoc
Committee explained:
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be
briefly summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts
continue to grow; long delays are routine; trials are too long;
the same issues are litigated over and over; transaction costs
8

See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
9
See ABA COMM’ N ON ASBESTOS LITIG ., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 5 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
full_report.pdf [hereinafter ABA COMM ’ N REP.].
10
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003) (quoting
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999)); see also In re
Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2005) (“For decades, the
state and federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos
lawsuits.”).
11
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION ,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (Mar. 1991), reprinted in 6:4
MEALEY ’S LITIG . REPS.: ASBESTOS 2 (Mar. 15, 1991) [hereinafter JUD . CONF.
REP.].
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exceed the victims’ recovery by nearly two to one;
exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and
future claimants may lose altogether.12
Even after this gloomy assessment, the litigation worsened “at
a much more rapid pace than even the most pessimistic
projections.”13 During the 1990s, the number of asbestos cases
pending nationwide doubled from 100,000 to more than 200,000.14
By 2002, approximately 730,000 claims had been filed,15 with
more than 100,000 claims filed in 2003 alone—“the most in a single
year.”16 In August 2005, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that approximately 322,000 asbestos-related claims were
pending in state and federal courts.17
B. Most Plaintiffs Had No Physical Injury from Asbestos
Exposure
The primary reason for this explosion in claims was that by the
early 2000s, the overwhelming majority of claims—up to 90
percent—were filed on behalf of plaintiffs who were “completely
asymptomatic.”18 These claimants may have had some marker of
12

Id. at 2–3.
GRIFFIN B. BELL , NAT’ L LEGAL CTR. FOR THE PUB . INTEREST, Asbestos
Litigation and Judicial Leadership: The Courts’ Duty to Help Solve the
Asbestos Litigation Crisis, 6:6 BRIEFLY , June 2002, at 2.
14
See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on
H.R. 1283, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 62 (1999)
(statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., Professor, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter
Edley Testimony].
15
See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND, ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG162.
16
Editorial, The Asbestos Blob, Cont., W ALL ST . J., Apr. 6, 2004, at
A16.
17
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES’ MASS TORTS SUBCOMMITTEE,
OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS CLAIMS AND TRENDS 5 (Aug. 2007), available at
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos_aug07.pdf [hereinafter AM. ACAD .
ACTUARIES].
18
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and
Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV . 815, 823 (2002); see also Roger Parloff,
13
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exposure, such as changes in the pleural membrane of their lungs,
but “are not now and never will be afflicted by disease.”19 In
contrast, when asbestos litigation first arose in the 1960s, most
claimants were “workers suffering from grave and crippling
maladies.”20
The key development was the use of mass screenings by
plaintiffs’ lawyers and their agents to generate many of the
unimpaired claimant filings.21 U.S. News & World Report described
the claimant recruiting process:

Welcome to the New Asbestos Scandal, FORTUNE, Sept. 6, 2004, at 186
(“According to estimates accepted by the most experienced federal judges in this
area, two-thirds to 90% of the nonmalignants are ‘unimpaireds’—that is, they
have slight or no physical symptoms.”); Kathryn Kranhold, GE To Record $115
Million Expense for Asbestos Claims, W ALL ST . J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A3 (GE
reporting that more than 80% of its pending cases involve claimants “who
aren’t sick”); Quenna Sook Kim, G-I Holdings’ Bankruptcy Filing Cites
Exposure in Asbestos Cases, W ALL ST . J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12 (“[A]s many
as 80% of [GAF’s] asbestos settlements are paid to unimpaired people.”); Alex
Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. T IMES,
Apr. 10, 2002, at A15.
19
Edley Testimony, supra note 14, at 67.
20
Roger Parloff, The $200 Billion Miscarriage of Justice; Asbestos
Lawyers Are Pitting Plaintiffs Who Aren’t Sick Against Companies that Never
Made the Stuff—and Extracting Billions for Themselves, FORTUNE , Mar. 4,
2002, at 158.
21
See Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos & The Sleeping Constitution, 31 PEPP. L.
REV . 1, 5 (2003). Screenings have frequently been conducted in areas with high
concentrations of workers who may have worked in jobs where they were
exposed to asbestos. See Owens Corning v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 322
B.R. 719, 723 (D. Del. 2005) (“Labor unions, attorneys, and other persons
with suspect motives [have] caused large numbers of people to undergo X-ray
examinations (at no cost), thus triggering thousands of claims by persons who
had never experienced adverse symptoms.”); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos
Litig., 237 F. Supp. 2d 297, 309 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 2002) (asbestos
claimants “are diagnosed largely through plaintiff-lawyer arranged mass
screenings programs targeting possible exposed asbestos-workers and attraction
of potential claimants through the mass media.”); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Am. Employers’ Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass. 1989) (“[M]any
of these cases result from mass X-ray screenings at occupational locations
conducted by unions and/or plaintiffs’ attorneys, and many claimants are
functionally asymptomatic when suit is filed.”).
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To unearth new clients for lawyers, screening firms
advertise in towns with many aging industrial workers or
park X-ray vans near union halls. To get a free X-ray,
workers must often sign forms giving law firms 40 percent
of any recovery. One solicitation reads: “Find out if YOU
have MILLION DOLLAR LUNGS!”22
Many X-ray interpreters (called “B Readers”) hired by plaintiffs’
lawyers were “so biased that their readings were simply
unreliable.”23 As one physician explained, “the chest x-rays are not
read blindly, but always with the knowledge of some asbestos
exposure and that the lawyer wants to file litigation on the
worker’s behalf.”24
It is estimated that more than one million workers have
undergone attorney-sponsored screenings.25 One worker explained,
“[i]t’s better than the lottery. If they find anything, I get a few
thousand dollars I didn’t have. If they don’t find anything, I’ve just
22

Pamela Sherrid, Looking for Some Million Dollar Lungs, U.S. N EWS &
W ORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001, at 36.
23
Owens Corning, 322 B.R. at 723; see also ABA COMM’ N REP., supra
note 9 (litigation screening companies find X-ray evidence that is “consistent
with” asbestos exposure at a “startlingly high” rate, often exceeding 50% and
sometimes reaching 90%); Joseph N. Gitlin et al., Comparison of “B”
Readers’ Interpretations of Chest Radiographs for Asbestos Related Changes,
11 ACAD . RADIOLOGY 843 (2004) (B Readers hired by plaintiffs claimed
asbestos-related lung abnormalities in 95.9% of the X-rays sampled, but
independent B Readers found abnormalities in only 4.5% of the same X-rays);
John M. Wylie II, The $40 Billion Scam, READER ’S DIGEST, Jan. 2007, at 74;
Editorial, Beware the B-Readers, W ALL ST . J., Jan. 23, 2006, at A16. As a
result of its findings, the ABA Commission proposed the enactment of federal
legislation to codify the evidence that physicians recognize is needed to show
impairment. The ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the Commission’s
proposal in February 2003. See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., Appen. A (Mar. 5, 2003) (statement of
Dennis Archer, President-Elect, ABA).
24
David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation,
31 PEPP. L. REV . 11, 13 (2003) (quoting Lawrence Martin, M.D.).
25
See Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos
Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality?, 31 PEPP. L.
REV . 33, 69 (2003); see also Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos
Litigation, 33 H OFSTRA L. REV . 833, 836–37 (2005).
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lost an afternoon.”26 If not for the mass filing by the unimpaired,
the asbestos litigation crisis may never have arisen.27
C. Most Defendants Had Little, If Any, Connection to the
Alleged Exposure
At the same time that tens of thousands of unimpaired claims
were being mass produced, many “traditional” asbestos defendants
who manufactured, mined, or sold asbestos 28 were seeking
bankruptcy court protection.29 The pace of bankruptcies
accelerated after 2000;30 it is now estimated that at least 85
companies have been forced into bankruptcy as a result of

26

Andrew Schneider, Asbestos Lawsuits Anger Critics, ST . LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2003, at A1.
27
See Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and Fiduciary Obligation in the
Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 W M. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL ’ Y REV . 243, 273 (2001); see also Wilson v. AC&S, Inc., 864 N.E.2d
682, 689 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (“The extraordinary volume of nonmalignant
asbestos cases continues to strain federal and state courts.”), dismissed, 864
N.E.2d 645 (Ohio 2007).
28
As Judge Freeman who administers the asbestos docket in New York has
explained,
[t]here are noteworthy differences between the bankrupt defendants and
those that are still solvent. As a group, the bankrupt corporations can
be characterized as ‘traditional’ asbestos defendants; they either mined
asbestos, or manufactured, sold, distributed or required asbestoscontaining products, including insulation, fire-proofing, construction
materials, and boilers. Until recently, these ‘traditional’ defendants
were the plaintiffs’ primary targets.
In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 750 N.Y.S.2d 469, 473–74 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2002). Traditional asbestos defendants include Johns-Manville, OwensCorning, Celotex, Pittsburgh Corning, Eagle-Picher, and Raybestos Manhattan.
29
See In re Combustion Eng’g, 391 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“[M]ounting asbestos liabilities have pushed otherwise viable companies into
bankruptcy.”).
30
See Christopher Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-BillionDollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 383, 392 (1993) (observing that each
time a defendant declares bankruptcy, “mounting and cumulative” financial
pressure is placed on the “remaining defendants, whose resources are limited”).
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asbestos-related liabilities.31
As a direct result of these bankruptcies, the net of liability
“spread from the asbestos makers to companies far removed from
the scene of any putative wrongdoing.”32 One well-known
plaintiffs’ attorney has described the litigation as an “endless
search for a solvent bystander.”33 By 2004, more than 8,500
defendants were caught up in the litigation34—up from the 300
defendants in 1983.35 This dramatic increase in claims has been
possible because of “the erosion or elimination of standards of
recovery, particularly causation and product identification.”36 At
least one company in nearly every U.S. industry is involved in the
litigation.37 Nontraditional defendants now account for more than
half of asbestos litigation expenditures.38
D. Jurisdictions Were Targeted, Causing the Legal Systems to
Crack
Another key factor accelerating the asbestos litigation has been
the concentration of claims in certain jurisdictions. RAND found
that from 1998 to 2000, eleven states saw the brunt of asbestos
filings: Texas (19%), Mississippi (18%), New York (12%), Ohio
31

See Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss, 92 ABA J. 26, 29

(2006).
32

Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, W ALL ST . J., Apr. 6, 2001, at
A14; see also Steven B. Hantler et al., Is the Crisis in the Civil Justice System
Real or Imagined?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV . 1121, 1151–52 (2005) (discussing
spread of asbestos litigation to “peripheral defendants”).
33
‘Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation’—A Discussion with
Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17:3 MEALEY ’S LITIG . REP.: ASBESTOS
5 (Mar. 1, 2002) (quoting Richard Scruggs).
34
See Deborah R. Hensler, California Asbestos Litigation—The Big
Picture, PERSPECTIVES FROM HARRISMARTIN’S COLUMNS—ASBESTOS, Aug.
26, 2004.
35
See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL ., RAND, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION
12 (1983).
36
James Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN . SURV. AM.
L. 223, 236 (2006).
37
AM. ACAD . ACTUARIES, supra note 17, at 5.
38
See CARROLL ET AL ., supra note 15, at 94.
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(12%), Maryland (7%), West Virginia (5%), Florida (4%),
Pennsylvania (3%), California (2%), Illinois (1%), and New Jersey
(1%).39 Sorting through the mass amount of claims against scores of
peripheral defendants placed significant pressure on courts where
asbestos claims were filed.40
Initially, some courts with thousands of lawsuits on their
dockets began taking well-intentioned, but ill-fated, procedural
shortcuts to usher the claims through the system. One such
example was the joining of a significant number of dissimilar claims
for trial. The largest single mass consolidation took place in West
Virginia in 2002, where the trial court joined more than 8,000
plaintiffs suing more than 250 defendants.41 The threat of massive
liability, including punitive damages, without attention paid to
individual claims and defenses, caused nearly every defendant to
settle for reportedly huge sums of money. 42 Other mass
consolidations occurred in Virginia and Mississippi.43 These
39

See id. at 62.
Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.
described the situation facing many judges with heavy asbestos caseloads in
testimony before Congress. See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1283 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 6 (July 1, 1999) (statement of the Hon. Conrad L. Mallett, Jr.). He
observed that trial court judges inundated with asbestos claims might feel
compelled to shortcut procedural rules:
Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on her 5,000 cases
all at the same time . . . . [I]f she scheduled all 5,000 cases for one
week trials, she would not complete her task until the year 2095. The
judge’s first thought then is, “How do I handle these cases quickly and
efficiently?” The judge does not purposely ignore fairness and truth, but
the demands of the system require speed and dictate case consolidation
even where the rules may not allow joinder.
40

Id.
41

See State ex rel. Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E.2d 793, 794 (W. Va.

2002).
42

See Mobil Settles, Leaving Carbide as Lone Asbestos Defendant, ASSOC.
PRESS STATE & LOCAL NEWSWIRE , Oct. 10, 2002.
43
See In re Hopeman Bros., Inc., 569 S.E.2d 409 (Va. 2002); The
Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Legislative Hearing on H.R.
1283 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 39–40 (1999)
(statement of Professor William Eskridge, Yale Law School), available at
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consolidations “so depart[ed] from [the] accepted norm as to be
presumptively violative of due process.”44 They often lumped
together people with serious illnesses, such as mesothelioma or
lung cancer, with claimants having different alleged harms or no
illness at all.45 Work histories and exposure levels among plaintiffs
varied widely. 46
In addition to fundamental unfairness and due process
concerns, the aggregation of dissimilar claims turned out to be a bit
like using a lawn mower to cut down weeds. The practice provided
a temporary fix, but created more problems than it solved in the
long run. Duke University Law School Professor Francis
McGovern has explained,
[j]udges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass
torts through their litigation process at low transaction
costs create the opportunity for new filings. They increase
demand for new cases by their high resolution rates and low
transaction costs. If you build a superhighway, there will be
a traffic jam.47
One West Virginia trial judge involved in asbestos litigation
http://judiciary.house.gov/judiciary/eskr0701.htm; John H. Beisner et al., One
Small Step for a County Court . . . One Giant Calamity for the National Legal
System, 7 C IVIL JUSTICE REP. 16 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.
manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cjr_07.pdf.
44
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993).
45
See State ex rel. Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E.2d 793, 794 (W. Va.
2002) (Maynard, J., concurring). Justice Elliott Maynard of the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has explained that mass consolidations involve
thousands of plaintiffs; twenty or more defendants; hundreds of different
work sites located in a number of different states; dozens of different
occupations and circumstances of exposure; dozens of different products
with different formulations, applications, and warnings; several different
diseases; numerous different claims at different stages of development;
and at least nine different law firms, with differing interests, representing
the various plaintiffs. Additionally, the challenged conduct spans the
better part of six decades.
Id.
46

See id.
Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ . L. REV . 595, 606 (1997).
47
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acknowledged this fact:
I will admit that we thought that [an early mass trial] was
probably going to put an end to asbestos, or at least knock
a big hole in it. What I didn’t consider was that that was a
form of advertising. That when we could whack that batch
of cases down that well, it drew more cases.48
This phenomenon is due to the fact that in filing asbestos-related
claims, there has been no relationship between the incidence of
disease and the number of suits filed.49
Consolidations and other procedural shortcuts, along with a
few high-profile verdicts and well-developed litigation tactics by
lawyers, forced defendants to settle claims, often en mass, rather
than sort through them and only pay the meritorious ones. One
particularly troubling tactic was the naming of scores, sometimes
hundreds, of defendants in a single exposure case50 and then settling
most of them for a modest amount (often less than $1,000) that
collectively generated tens of thousands of dollars for unimpaired
claimants without having to show specific harm or causation
against a named defendant.
48

Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco,
Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation versus
Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans That Defer
Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV . 271, 284–85 (2003) (quoting
In re Asbestos Litig., Civ. Action No. 00-Misc.-222 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha
County, W. Va. Nov. 8, 2000)); see also Helen E. Freedman, Product Liability
Issues in Mass Torts—View from the Bench, 15 TOURO L. REV . 685, 688
(1999) (Judge overseeing New York City asbestos litigation stating,
“[i]ncreased efficiency may encourage additional filings and provide an overly
hospitable environment for weak cases.”).
49
See Asbestos Litigation Crisis Continues: It Is Time for Congress to
Act: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. Mar. 5,
2003 (statement of David Austern, Trustee for the Manville Trust) available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=617&wit_id=1675.
David Austern, Trustee for the Manville Trust, has described the asbestos
claim generation process as the economic model of claims filing as opposed to a
medical model. See id.
50
See Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN . INS. L.J. 255, 272
(2005).

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES

603

E. Payments to Truly Sick Became Threatened
Over the last few years, it has become clear that mass filings by
unimpaired claimants have exhausted scarce resources that should
go to “the sick and the dying, their widows and survivors.”51 The
“very small percentage of the cases filed [with] serious asbestosrelated afflictions . . . [were] prone to be lost in the shuffle.”52 For
example, the Manville trustees reported that a “disproportionate
amount of Trust settlement dollars have gone to the least injured
claimants—many with no discernible asbestos-related physical
impairment whatsoever.”53 The Trust is now paying out five cents
on the dollar to asbestos claimants.54 Other asbestos-related
bankruptcy trusts, such as the Celotex and Eagle-Picher Settlement
Trusts, also have had to cut payments to claimants.55
Some lawyers who represented the sick claimants have since
joined with defendants and others in calling for a return of the rule
of law in asbestos litigation. Here is what some of these lawyers
51

In re Collins, 233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Larson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Mich. 1986) (“We believe that
discouraging suits for relatively minor consequences of asbestos exposure will
lead to a fairer allocation of resources to those victims who develop cancers.”); In
re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“Overhanging this massive failure of the present system is the
reality that there is not enough money available from traditional defendants to
pay for current and future claims.”), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992); In re
Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Admin. Order No. 8, 2002 WL
32151574, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2002) (“Oftentimes these suits are brought
on behalf of individuals who are asymptomatic as to an asbestos-related illness
and may not suffer any symptoms in the future. Filing fees are paid, service costs
incurred, and defense files are opened and processed. Substantial transaction
costs are expended and therefore unavailable for compensation to truly
ascertained asbestos victims.”).
52
In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, 1996 WL
539589, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996).
53
Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets Are Reduced as the
Medically Unimpaired File Claims, W ALL ST . J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6.
54
Id.
55
See Mark Goodman et al., Editorial, Plaintiffs’ Bar Now Opposes
Unimpaired Asbestos Suits, N AT’ L L.J., Apr. 1, 2002, at B14.; Stengel, supra
note 36, at 262.
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have said:
• Matthew Bergman of Seattle: “Victims of mesothelioma,
the most deadly form of asbestos-related illness, suffer the
most from the current system . . . [T]he genuinely sick and
dying are often deprived of adequate compensation as more
and more funds are diverted into settlements of the nonimpaired claims.”56
• Peter Kraus of Dallas: Plaintiffs’ lawyers who file suits
on behalf of the non-sick are “sucking the money away
from the truly impaired.”57
• Terrence Lavin of Chicago (and former Illinois State Bar
President): “Members of the asbestos bar have made a
mockery of our civil justice system and have inflicted
financial ruin on corporate America by representing people
with nothing more than an arguable finding on an X-ray.”58
• Steve Kazan of Oakland: “The current asbestos litigation
system is a tragedy for our clients. We see people every
day who are very seriously ill. Many have only a few
months to live. It used to be that I could tell a man dying of
mesothelioma that I could make sure that his family would
be taken care of. That statement was worth a lot to my
clients, and it was true. Today, I often cannot say that any
more. And the reason is that other plaintiffs’ attorneys are
filing tens of thousands of claims every year for people
who have absolutely nothing wrong with them.”59

56

Matthew Bergman & Jackson Schmidt, Editorial, Change Rules on
Asbestos Lawsuits, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 30, 2002, at B7.
57
Susan Warren, Competing Claims: As Asbestos Mess Spreads, Sickest
See Payouts Shrink, W ALL ST . J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A1.
58
Editorial, ABA Backs Asbestos Reform, W ASH . T IMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at
B2.
59
See Asbestos Litigation: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Steven Kazan), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=472&wit_ id=1206.
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III. T HE TRIAL C OURT CHECKLIST FOR F AIRLY M ANAGING
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Over the last several years, courts and legislatures have begun
restoring the rule of law to asbestos litigation, taking measures to
rein in the most prevalent abuses in the litigation. These actions,
which are set forth in the checklist below, have aided the fair
treatment of both seriously injured asbestos claimants and
defendants where the litigation has been most prolific. In particular,
there is now greater recognition that it is unsound public policy to
award damages to plaintiffs who have no current physical
impairment from exposure to asbestos. 60 Rather, it is best to
prioritize the claims of those who are truly sick and preserve assets
for those injured parties. Courts also have taken measures that
allow claims to be determined more accurately, on their merits, and
in appropriate jurisdictions. In addition, many courts are taking a
much more thorough look at issues such as duty and the science of
unsound causation claims by plaintiffs’ experts. Trial courts should
use this checklist to heed the lessons of the past and produce
sound asbestos litigation results in the future.
The categories and checklist items are as follows:
A. CURB IMPROPER F ORUM SHOPPING
•

60

Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction
is appropriate for the specific case given the
jurisdiction’s connection to the alleged exposure(s),

See, e.g., Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62
N.Y.U. ANN . SURV. AM. L. 525, 531 (2007) (“[I]t is unreasonable to
compensate hundreds of thousands of people exposed to asbestos, who may have
physical markers of exposure, but who have no current impairment from a
disease caused by asbestos exposure.”); Matthew Mall, Note, Derailing the
Gravy Train: A Three-Pronged Approach to End Fraud in Mass Tort
Litigation, 48 W M. & MARY L. REV . 2043, 2061–62 (2007) (“By limiting
cases to those claimants suffering from actual, physical impairment, [medical
criteria laws requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate asbestos-related physical
impairment] reserve judicial resources and corporate money for those claimants
that need it most.”).
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parties, and witnesses; enforce venue and forum non
conveniens laws to transfer cases more appropriately
heard in other jurisdictions.

B. PRIORITIZE CLAIMS OF THE TRULY SICK
•
•

Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to
bring or proceed with a claim.
Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the
diagnosis alleging injury by determining whether the
claim was generated through a litigation screening or is
supported by a report from a physician that has been
implicated in fraudulent civil filings.

C. A PPLY TRADITIONAL T ORT LITIGATION PROCEDURES
•
•

•

Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims.
Checklist Item #5: Assure
discovery
rules
are
appropriate for each claim and defendant; if “form”
discovery is used in one’s jurisdiction, make sure it is
appropriate and not overly burdensome as applied in
individual cases.
Checklist Item #6: Do not short-circuit trials.

D. O NLY A LLOW CLAIMS A GAINST DEFENDANTS WHERE
T HERE IS A LEGAL BASIS FOR LIABILITY
•
•
•

Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should
owe no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site,
secondhand exposure to asbestos.
Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law
distinctions for when premises owners can be liable for
injuries to contractors’ employees.
Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers
should not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related
hazards in external or replacement parts made, supplied,
or installed by others and affixed post-manufacture.
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E. O NLY A LLOW A D EFENDANT TO BE H ELD LIABLE IF ITS
CONDUCT OR PRODUCT WAS A LEGAL C AUSE OF THE A LLEGED
INJURY
•
•

•
•

Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on
expert testimony and assure that materials experts rely
on actually support their claims.
Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in
causing the alleged harm.
Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate
product identification by dismissing cases where
product identification is not sufficient.
Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other
asbestos-related cancers.

F. ASSURE J URIES CAN F ULLY C OMPENSATE D ESERVING
P LAINTIFFS WHILE PRESERVING ASSETS FOR F UTURE CLAIMANTS
•
•

•

•
•

Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement
trust claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and
declare intentions to file any future claims.
Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits
and offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to
satisfy a legal claim directed at the injury alleged in
accordance with state law.
Checklist Item #16: Allow collateral sources to be
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for all
collateral sources that provided compensation to the
plaintiff for the alleged harm.
Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint
and several liability rules.
Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages
claims.
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The actions included in these checklist items, along with state
medical criteria laws and other legislative reforms, have proven to
be effective in reducing the number of premature and abusive
claims. Jennifer Biggs, who chairs the Mass Torts Subcommittee of
the American Academy of Actuaries, has found that “[a] lot of
companies that were seeing 40,000 cases in 2002 and 2003 have
dropped to the 15,000 level.”61 Frederick Dunbar, a senior vice
president of NERA Economic Consulting, recently studied the
Securities and Exchange Commission filings of eighteen large
asbestos defendants and found that, “for all of them, 2004 asbestos
claims had dropped from peak levels of the previous three years.
Ten companies saw claims fall by more than half between 2003 and
2004.”62 A prominent Ohio asbestos litigation defense lawyer has
said that Ohio’s medical criteria law “dramatically cut the number
of new case filings by more than 90%.”63 The CEO of a large
mutual insurer further highlighted the effects of recent asbestos
reforms at the state level in testimony before Congress:
The beneficial impact of these efforts cannot be overstated.
Historically Texas, Ohio and Mississippi have been the
leading states to generate claims filed against [our]
policyholders, collectively accounting for approximately
80% of the asbestos claims filed against [our] insureds.
Since the statutory and judicial reforms in those three key
states, the decrease in the volume of claims has been truly
remarkable. In Mississippi, the decrease has been 90%, in
Texas nearly 65% and, in Ohio, approximately 35%.
Across all states, from 2004 to 2005 we have seen over a
50% decrease in the number of new claims filed, a trend that
continued in 2006. These numbers are the best evidence
that state-driven initiatives are working . . . .64
61

Alison Frankel, Asbestos Removal, 28:7 AM. LAW ., July 2006, at 15.
Id.; see also Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, State-Based
Reforms: Making a Difference in Asbestos and Silica Cases, 28 No. 22
ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG . RPTR. 12 (2006).
63
Peter Geier, States Taking up Medical Criteria: Move is to Control
Asbestos Caseload, N AT’ L L.J., May 22, 2006, at 1.
64
The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: Legislative
Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., at 5 (2006)
62
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A. Curb Improper Forum Shopping
1. Checklist Item #1: Determine if the court’s jurisdiction is
appropriate for the specific case given the jurisdiction’s
connection to the alleged exposure(s), parties, and
witnesses; enforce venue and forum non conveniens laws
to transfer cases more appropriately heard in other
jurisdictions.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers often strategically flock to forums where
they believe they have a tactical advantage rather than file where
there is a logical and factual connection to a claim or claimant. 65
Indeed, throughout the past thirty years, asbestos claims have
shown a remarkable ability to migrate from state-to-state and
jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction depending on which courts plaintiffs’
lawyers believed would give them the greatest chance of achieving
favorable recoveries.66 Given the scores of defendants typically
(testimony of Edmund F. Kelly, Chairman, President & CEO, Liberty Mutual
Group).
65
See Richard Scruggs, Asbestos for Lunch, Panel Discussion at the
Prudential Securities Financial Research and Regulatory Conference (May 9,
2002), in Industry Commentary (Prudential Securities, Inc., N.Y., New York),
June 11, 2002, at 5; see also Richard Scruggs, Tobacco Lawyers’ Roundtable:
A Report from the Front Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV . 543, 545 (2001).
Mississippi plaintiffs’ lawyer Richard Scruggs has dubbed these places “magic
jurisdictions” because they have reputations for producing large settlements and
verdicts:
What I call the “magic jurisdiction,” . . . [is] where the judiciary is
elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers have established
relationships with the judges that are elected; they’re State Court
judges; they’re popul[ists]. They’ve got large populations of voters
who are in on the deal, they’re getting their [piece] in many cases. And
so, it’s a political force in their jurisdiction, and it’s almost impossible
to get a fair trial if you’re a defendant.
Id.
66

See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 15, at 61–62. RAND found that from
1970 through 1987 California bore 31% of asbestos claims that were filed, but
only 5% from 1988 to 1992, 2% from 1993 to 1997, and 2% from 1998 to
2000. Texas trended in the opposite direction, accounting for only 3% of initial
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named in asbestos cases, plaintiffs’ lawyers often have numerous
jurisdictions from which to choose. In addition, some companies
are named “simply to try and keep the cases” in certain
jurisdictions.67
From the mid-1990s through 2003, Madison County, Illinois
was a particularly popular destination for asbestos litigation.68
Asbestos claims had risen quickly from 65 in 1996 to a peak of 953
in 2003.69 During those years, Madison County received significant
negative publicity for hearing cases that did not have the proper
connections to the County.70 In response, the Illinois Supreme
Court has removed some of the “pull” from the magnet
jurisdictions. In Dawdy v. Union Pacific Ry. Co.,71 the court held
that a foreign plaintiff’s forum choice deserves less deference if it is
not the plaintiff’s home.72 In Gridley v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co.,73 the court remanded a Louisiana man’s case who was not
injured in Illinois with directions to dismiss the complaint based on
forum non conveniens.74 In addition, a new judge was appointed to
oversee Madison County’s asbestos docket.75 He began enforcing
the state’s venue and forum non conveniens laws.76 In one of his
asbestos claims filed from 1970 to 1987, 15% from 1988 to 1992, an astounding
44% from 1993 to 1997, and 19% from 1998 to 2000. Id.
67
Steven D. Wasserman et al., Asbestos Litigation in California: Can it
Change for the Better?, 34 PEPP. L. R EV . 883, 886 (2007).
68
See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison County,
Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 W ASH. U. J.L. & P OL’ Y 235, 243–44
(2004).
69
See id.
70
See, e.g., Brian Brueggemann, Forum Participants: Investigate Madison
County Court System, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Apr. 15, 2004; Sanford
J. Schmidt, Lawyers Spar Over Asbestos Filings, T HE T ELEGRAPH, Apr. 15,
2004.
71
797 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. 2003).
72
Id. at 694.
73
840 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. 2005).
74
Id. at 280–81.
75
See Paul Hampel, Dismissal of Asbestos Suits is Change for Madison
County, ST . LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 29, 2005, at 6.
76
See, e.g., Palmer v. Riley Stoker Corp., No. 04-L-167, 8–9 (Madison
County Cir. Ct., Ill. Oct. 4, 2004) (order granting motion to transfer on the
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first acts in this new role, the judge ordered the transfer of several
out-of-state asbestos cases, noting that they “would place an
astronomical burden upon the citizens of Madison County . . . . It
is one thing to make such efforts to accommodate the citizens of
Madison County and others whose cases bear some connection or
reason to be here.”77 In 2004, asbestos litigation in Madison
County dropped 50% to 477 filings; the number fell further to 389
in 2005 and to 325 in 2006.78
In the past few years, Delaware and California have attracted
considerable attention as places to file asbestos claims.79 For
example, the Madison County Record has observed that the number
of new asbestos lawsuits dropped precipitously in Madison
County in recent years, but the corresponding “deluge of filings is
keeping clerks in a Delaware court working nights and weekends to
keep up.”80 One Madison County lawyer acknowledged this
basis of forum non conveniens).
77
Palmer v. Riley Stoker Corp., No. 04-L-167 (Madison County Cir. Ct.,
Ill. Oct. 4, 2004).
78
Steve Gonzalez, Judges Not Worried About Madison County Asbestos
Upsurge, T HE RECORD, July 26, 2007, available at http://madisonrecord.com/
printer/article.asp?c=198493.
79
See Steve Korris, Asbestos Shift to Delaware is Sign of Distinction for
Madison County, T HE RECORD, July 7, 2005, available at http://
madisonrecord.com/news/newsview.asp?c=162805; Wasserman et al., supra
note 67, at 885 (“With plaintiff firms from Texas and elsewhere opening offices
in California, there is no doubt that even more asbestos cases are on their way to
the state.”); Hanlon & Smetak, supra, note 60, at 599 (“[P]laintiffs’ firms are
steering cases to California, partly to the San Francisco-Oakland area, which is
traditionally a tough venue for defendants, but also Los Angeles, which was an
important asbestos venue in the 1980s but is only recently seeing an upsurge in
asbestos cases.”); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Litigation Tourism Hurts
Californians, 21:20 MEALEY ’S LITIG . REP.: ASB. 20 (Nov. 15, 2006)
(reporting that over 30% of pending asbestos claims sampled in California
involve plaintiffs with out-of-state addresses); Emily Bryson York, More
Asbestos Cases Heading to Courthouses Across Region, 28:9 L.A. BUS. J. 8
(Feb. 27, 2006) (“California is positioned to become a front in the ongoing
asbestos litigation war.”); Steven Weller et al., Report on the California Three
Track Civil Litigation Study 28 (Policy Studies Inc. July 31, 2002), available
at www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-3TrackCivJur.pdf (“The San Francisco
Superior Court seems to be a magnet court for the filing of asbestos cases.”).
80
Steve Korris, Delaware Court Seeing Upsurge in Asbestos Filings, T HE
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practice, stating, “We’re just filing [cases] in different places.”81
This practice of “litigation tourism”82 is one of the main reasons
the litigation has proved difficult to contain.83
To avoid being a litigation tourist destination, trial courts
should, as they do in Mississippi, permit defendants to motion for
a more definite statement from the plaintiffs that jurisdiction is
proper as to each claim.84 As a result of these motions, one
Mississippi court “dismissed the claims of 437 non-resident
plaintiffs who did not allege either exposure in the State of
Mississippi to a defendant’s asbestos-containing product or claims
against a Mississippi resident defendant.”85 The same court also
dismissed several claims for failure to comply with a court order
directing the plaintiffs to perfect transfer of the cases to their
respective proper venues in Mississippi.86 Similar measures have
been undertaken in Ohio.87

RECORD (Madison/St. Clair County, Ill.), July 1, 2005, available at
http://madisonrecord.com/news/newsview.asp?c=162494.
81
Brian Brueggemann, Asbestos Lawsuits Continue to Decline,
BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT , June 21, 2005, at 3B (quoting Mike Angelides
of the SimmonsCooper firm).
82
See AMERICAN T ORT REFORM FOUND ., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2005, at
46 (2005), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2005/Hellholes
2005.pdf (“[P]laintiffs’ attorneys become the ‘travel agents’ for the ‘litigation
tourist’ industry, filing claims in jurisdictions with little or no connection to
their clients’ claims.”).
83
For example, in one case, an Indiana plaintiff with mesothelioma filed a
claim against U.S. Steel in Madison County, Illinois, for injuries allegedly
sustained from asbestos exposure at a U.S. Steel plant in Indiana. The plaintiff
had no significant connection to Illinois, much less to Madison County.
Nevertheless, his trial resulted in a $250 million verdict. See Brian
Brueggemann, Man Awarded $250 Million in Cancer Case, BELLEVILLE
NEWS-DEMOCRAT , Mar. 29, 2003, at 1A.
84
See Gordon v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 962 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 2007);
Culbert v. Johnson & Johnson, 883 So. 2d 550 (Miss. 2004) (transferring instate cases to the proper county and dismissing out-of-state plaintiffs).
85
Id. at 549 n.3.
86
Id. at 550.
87
See OHIO CIV . R. 3(B)(11).
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B. Prioritize Claims of the Truly Sick
As discussed earlier, mass filings by unimpaired claimants have
been a particular problem in asbestos litigation. Courts have found
that the best guard against the continued filing of premature, or
potentially fraudulent, claims by the unimpaired is to require all
plaintiffs to develop the record early in the litigation regarding their
alleged level of impairment and the credibility of their diagnoses
upon which the claims are based.
1. Checklist Item #2: Require plaintiff to show credible
evidence of asbestos-related impairment in order to
bring or proceed with a claim.
Asbestos claimants generally have alleged various types of
injuries, including mesothelioma, lung cancer and nonmalignant
conditions that plaintiffs often refer to as asbestosis or pleural
plaques. Mesothelioma is a type of cancer most often associated
with asbestos exposure, though it has other causes and can occur
idiopathically.88 For mesothelioma and lung cancer claims, a
plaintiff should be required to present evidence verifying the
condition with an exposure history and a credible doctor’s report
certifying the condition as being asbestos-related.
Allegations of nonmalignant asbestos-related conditions, such
as asbestosis, are more challenging for courts because they are
subject to misinterpretation and abuse. Many people merely allege
radiographic evidence of asbestos exposure, but only people who
are physically impaired from exposure to asbestos should be
permitted to bring an asbestos claim. A court can determine
whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim by requiring the plaintiff
to provide the court with three core pieces of information from a
treating physician: (1) a thorough occupational, exposure, and
medical history; (2) an x-ray showing markings on the plaintiff’s
88

See Thomas A. Sporn & Victor L. Roggli, Mesothelioma in
PATHOLOGY OF ASBESTOS-ASSOCIATED D ISEASES 104, 108 (Victor Roggli et
al., eds., 2d ed., Springer 2004) (1992) (stating evidence that between ten and
twenty percent of mesothelioma cases are not asbestos-related, but are
idiopathic).
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lung that are consistent with asbestos exposure; and (3) a
pulmonary function test showing breathing impairment outside of
the normal range.89
Trial courts have several options for handling claims that fail to
meet all three of these base-line tests. First, the actions can be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.90 Courts in Arizona,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have held that
physically unimpaired asbestos claimants do not have legally
compensable claims.91 Federal courts interpreting Hawaii and
Massachusetts laws have reached the same conclusion.92 As one of
the courts explained, “[t]here is generally no cause of action in tort
until a plaintiff has suffered an identifiable, compensable injury.”93
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further specified that in asbestos
cases, markings in the pleural linings of the lung without any
accompanying impairment does not create a “compensable injury
which gives rise to a cause of action.”94 Individuals with these
conditions, the court concluded, “lead active, normal lives, with no
pain or suffering, no loss of an organ function, and no disfigurement
due to scarring.”95 Thus, they have no claim.
89

See generally Dr. John E. Parker, Understanding Asbestos-Related
Medical Criteria, 18-10 MEALEY’S LITIG . R EP.: ASBESTOS 25 (June 18, 2003).
90
FED . R. C IV . P. 12(b).
91
See Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987);
In re Asbestos Litig. Leary Trial Group, Nos. 87C-09-24, 90C-09-79, 88C-0978, 1994 WL 721763 (Del. Super. June 14, 1994), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. Mancari v. A.C. & S., Inc., 670 A.2d 1339 (Del. 1995); Bernier v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986); Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong,
591 A.2d 544 (1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 604 A.2d
47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232
(Pa.1996).
92
See In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw.
1990); In re Mass. Asbestos Cases, 639 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1985).
93
Bernier, 516 A.2d at 542.
94
See Simmons, 674 A.2d at 237.
95
Id. at 236; see also In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL
875, 1996 WL 539589, at *2 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996) (“Pleural disease is
most often an asymptomatic scarring of the pleura—a tissue thin membrane
surrounding the lung. Many states, including Pennsylvania, do not allow for a
cause of action based upon this condition alone if it is asymptomatic. It can only
be discovered through x-ray and, in and of itself, does not pose a health risk or
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Second, trial courts may administratively dismiss claims
brought by the non-sick. For example, in the federal asbestos multidistrict litigation, the late Judge Charles Weiner administratively
dismissed all cases where the plaintiff could not provide the court
with sufficient medical evidence of a “compensable injury
sufficient to sustain a cause of action,”96 stating that he would
reinstate them if and when the claimant shows evidence of asbestos
exposure and an asbestos-related disease.97 The order stated
simply, “it is ORDERED that the referenced cases are dismissed
without prejudice. The Statute of Limitations is tolled. Parties are
to notify the Court if they wish these cases reactivated.”98
Thousands of cases involving unimpaired claimants were dismissed
under this and similar plans issued by this court.
Finally, a trial court can create an inactive docket (also called a
pleural registry or deferred docket) to set aside and preserve the
claims of the non-sick.99 Inactive asbestos dockets were first
adopted in the late 1980s and early 1990s in jurisdictions that were
experiencing large numbers of filings by the unimpaired—
Massachusetts (September 1986), Chicago (March 1991), and
Baltimore City (December 1992).100 Since 2002, the list of
impairment.”).
96
See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Civ. Action
No. 2, 1996 WL 239863, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1996).
97
See id.
98
See id.; In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Order
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1997).
99
See Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in
Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ’ Y 541 (1992); see also In re
Report of the Advisory Group, 1993 WL 30497, at *51 (D. Me. Feb. 1, 1993)
(“[P]laintiffs need not engage in the expense of trial for what are still minimal
damages, but are protected in their right to recover if their symptoms later
worsen.”).
100
See Mark A. Behrens & Monica Parham, Stewardship for the Sick:
Preserving Assets For Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33
T EX . T ECH L. REV . 1 (2001); In re Asbestos Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death
Asbestos Cases, 1992 WL 12019620 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Md. Dec. 9,
1992). The Massachusetts inactive docket has been “really a very good system
that has worked out.” Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: Are They Easing the Flow
of Litigation?, HARRISMARTIN ’S COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, Feb. 2002, at 2
(quoting Judge Hiller Zobel). Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Richard
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jurisdictions with inactive asbestos dockets has grown to include
Cleveland, Ohio (March 2006); Minnesota (coordinated litigation)
(June 2005); St. Clair County, Illinois (February 2005);
Portsmouth, Virginia (August 2004); Madison County, Illinois
(January 2004); Syracuse, New York (January 2003); New York
City (December 2002); and Seattle, Washington (December
2002).101 In 2005, RAND referred to the “reemergence” of inactive
dockets as one of “the most significant developments” in asbestos
litigation.102
2. Checklist Item #3: Establish the credibility of the diagnosis
alleging injury by determining whether the claim was
generated through a litigation screening or is supported
by a report from a physician that has been implicated in
fraudulent civil filings.
A key turning point in the mass generation of asbestos claims
was a landmark ruling in June 2005 by the manager of the federal
silica multi-district litigation, U.S. District Judge Janis Graham Jack
of the Southern District of Texas. Judge Jack recommended that all
but one of the 10,000 federal court silica claims be dismissed on
remand because the diagnoses were fraudulently prepared.103 Judge
Jack said in her opinion: “[T]hese diagnoses were driven by neither
health nor justice . . . . [T]hey were manufactured for money.”104
Rombro has said “the docket is working.” In re Pers. Injury & Wrongful Death
Asbestos Cases, No. 24-X-92-344501, at 5 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Md. Aug.
15, 2002) (Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Modification to
Unimpaired Docket Medical Removal Criteria).
101
See Mark A. Behrens & Phil Goldberg, Asbestos Litigation: Momentum
Builds for State-Based Medical Criteria Solutions to Address Filings by the
Non-Sick, 20:6 MEALEY ’S LITIG . REP.: ASBESTOS 33 (Apr. 13, 2005); Mark A.
Behrens & Manuel López, Unimpaired Asbestos Dockets: They Are
Constitutional, 24 REV . LITIG . 253 (2005).
102
CARROLL ET AL., supra note 15, at xx.
103
See In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig, MDL 1553, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563,
642 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]here is only one of the 10,000 Plaintiffs whom the
Court can say with confidence is genuinely injured.”).
104
Id. at 635; see also Fred Krutz & Jennifer R. Devery, In the Wake of
Silica MDL 1553, 4:5 MEALEY’S LITIG . REP. S ILICA 1, 2 (2006); Mike
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The B readers and screening firms referenced in Judge Jack’s
opinion have helped generate tens of thousands of asbestos claims.
For example, it has been reported that seventy-two percent of the
claimants before Judge Jack had filed asbestos-related claims,105
even though it is “statistically speaking, nearly impossible” to
suffer from both asbestosis and silicosis.106 Dr. Ray Harron
reportedly diagnosed disease in 51,048 Manville claims and
supplied 88,258 reports in support of other claims. 107 In one day,
Dr. Harron reportedly diagnosed 515 people, or the equivalent of
more than one a minute in an eight-hour shift.108 Dr. James Ballard
provided 10,700 primary diagnoses and another 30,329 reports in
Tolson, Attorneys Behind Silicosis Suits Draw U.S. Judge’s Wrath/Houston
Legal Firm Fined; Order From Bench Says Diagnoses Made for the Money,
HOUSTON CHRON ., July 2, 2005, at A1; Mike Tolson, A Dozen Doctors,
20,000 Silicosis Cases/By Signing Off, X-Ray Readers Put Names on Scandal,
HOUSTON CHRON., May 8, 2006, at A1; Mike Tolson, Exposing the Truth
Behind Silicosis, H OUSTON CHRON., May 7, 2006, at A1; Editorial, Silicosis,
Inc., W ALL ST . J., Oct. 27, 2005, at A20.
105
See Editorial, Trial Bar Cleanup, W ALL ST . J., Feb. 11, 2006, at A8;
see also Asbestos: Mixed Dust and FELA Issues: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005) (statement of Professor
Lester Brickman, Cardozo Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=1362&wit_id=3963 (reporting that 60% of the federal court
silica claimants had filed asbestos claims with the Manville Trust).
106
Carlyn Kolker, Spreading the Blame: The So-Called Phantom Epidemic
of Silicosis Has Become a Hot Potato for the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 27:10 AM. LAW .,
Oct. 2005, at 24.
107
See Editorial, Silicosis Clam-up, W ALL ST . J., Mar. 13, 2006, at A18.
108
See id. Recently, Dr. Harron reached an agreement with the Texas
Medical Board that he will never again practice medicine in Texas. According to
the medical board’s website:
On April 13, 2007, the Board and Dr. Harron entered into an Agreed
Order pursuant to which Dr Harron agreed not to practice medicine in
the period before his medical license expires, not to renew his medical
license after it expires and not to petition the Board for reinstatement or
re-issuance of his license.
News Release, Tex. Med. Bd., Medical Board Disciplines 34 Doctors (Apr. 18,
2007), available at http://www.tmb.state.tx. us/news/press/2007/041807a.php.
The Board acted “based on allegations related to silica/silicosis litigation and
Dr. Harron’s determination and signature on x-ray findings of silicosis for
numerous silicosis plaintiffs.” Id.
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support of asbestos claims.109 According to Manville Trust
records, Dr. Jay Segarra “participated in almost 40,000 positive
diagnoses for asbestos-related illnesses over the last 13 years, or
about eight per day, every day, including weekends and holidays.
There were about 200 days on which Dr. Segarra rendered positive
diagnoses for more than 20 people, and 14 days with more than
50.”110
Judge Jack’s findings have impacted, and will continue to
impact, asbestos litigation.111 For example, the Court of Common
Pleas of Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio recently dismissed
approximately 3,755 asbestos cases after the screening doctors,
some of whom had been involved in the silicosis litigation, refused
to testify, asserting their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.112 The court also put aside another 35,000 asbestos
cases where plaintiffs were diagnosed by the same doctors until
those plaintiffs receive diagnoses from other doctors. 113 Similarly,
Claims Resolution Management Corporation, which manages the
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, has stated that it will
no longer accept medical reports prepared by the doctors and
screening companies that were the subject of Judge Jack’s
opinion.114
Several other trusts have followed Manville’s lead, including
the Eagle-Picher, Celotex, Halliburton (DII Industries), and Keene
Creditors Trusts. 115 Most recently, the current manager of the
109

See Editorial, Silicosis Clam-up, supra note 107.
Adam Liptak, Defendants See a Case of Diagnosing for Dollars, N.Y.
T IMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A14.
111
See Lester Brickman, On the Applicability of the Silica MDL
Proceeding to Asbestos Litigation, 12 CONN . I NS. L.J. 289 (2006).
112
See In re Cuyahoga County Asbestos Cases, Special Docket 73958 (Ct.
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County, Ohio Mar. 22, 2006); Peter Geier, Thousands of
Asbestos Cases Dismissed, N AT’ L L.J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 13.
113
Davies, Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits Against Companies Sharply Decline, supra
note 6, at A9.
114
Memorandum from David Austern, President, Claims Resolution
Management Corporation, Suspension of Acceptance of Medical Reports (Sept.
12, 2005), available at http://www.claimsres.com/documents/9%2005%20
Suspension%20Memo.pdf.
115
Letter from William B. Nurre, Executive Director, Eagle-Picher Personal
110
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federal asbestos multi-district litigation docket, United States
District Judge James Giles of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
stated that, because “[c]urrent litigation efforts in this court and in
the silica litigation have revealed that many mass screenings lack
reliability and accountability and have been conducted in a manner
which failed to adhere to certain necessary medical standards and
regulations,” the court will “entertain motions and conduct such
hearings as may be necessary to resolve questions of evidentiary
sufficiency in non-malignant cases supported only by the results of
mass screenings which allegedly fail to comport with acceptable
screening standards.”116
Given the claim generation history, the credibility of claims
must be properly scrutinized. Also, trial courts should join the
recent movement to reject claims generated by the screening firms
and physicians that were the subject of Judge Jack’s opinion.
C. Apply Traditional Tort Litigation Procedures
There is now a better understanding that creating separate, fasttrack procedures for asbestos cases fueled the claim-generation
engine for unimpaired claimants by encouraging the settlement of
claims without regard to their merits. 117 In the last few years,
Injury Settlement Trust, to Claimants’ Counsel (Oct. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.cpf-inc.com/includes/content/PhysicianNotice.pdf; Notice of Trust
Policy Regarding Acceptance of Medical Reports from John L. Mekus,
Executive Director, Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust (Oct. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.celotextrust. com/news_details.asp?nid=22.
116
In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), MDL 875, Admin. Order No.
8, 2007 WL 2372400, *2 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2007).
117
Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallet, Jr.
described in testimony to Congress the pressure that trial court judges inundated
with asbestos claims might feel to shortcut procedural rules:
Think about a county circuit judge who has dropped on her 5,000 cases
all at the same time . . . . [I]f she scheduled all 5,000 cases for one
week trials, she would not complete her task until the year 2095. The
judge’s first thought then is, “How do I handle these cases quickly and
efficiently?” The judge does not purposely ignore fairness and truth, but
the demands of the system require speed and dictate case consolidation
even where the rules may not allow joinder.
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courts have restored order to asbestos cases and effectively reduced
incentives for new filings by unimpaired claimants.
1. Checklist Item #4: Do not consolidate dissimilar claims.
The use of joinder to consolidate dissimilar claims has been
discredited and should not be allowed. In 2004, the Mississippi
Supreme Court began severing multi-plaintiff asbestos-related
cases.118 In 2006, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted an
administrative order to preclude the “bundling” of asbestos-related
cases for trial, stating that “each case should be decided on its own
merits, and not in conjunction with other cases. Thus, no asbestosrelated disease personal injury action shall be joined with any other
such case for settlement or for any other purpose, with the
exception of discovery.”119 Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court
amended the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure to preclude the joinder
of pending asbestos-related actions for trial purposes.120 In
addition, Georgia, Kansas, and Texas have enacted laws to prevent
The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1283
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 320 (1999) (statement
of Former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Conrad L. Mallet, Jr.).
118
See, e.g., Harold’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Mangialardi, 889 So. 2d 493
(Miss. 2004); Albert v. Allied Grove Corp., 944 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2006);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Rogers, 912 So. 2d 853 (Miss. 2005); Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Gregory, 912 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 2005); 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895
So. 2d 151 (Miss. 2005); Alexander v. ACandS, Inc., 947 So. 2d 891 (Miss.
2007); see also Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for Business:
The Transformation of Mississippi’s Legal Climate, 24 MISS. C. L. REV . 393
(2005); David Maron & Walker W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A
Closer Look at Mass Tort Screening and The Impact of Mississippi Tort
Reforms, 26 M ISS. C. L. R EV . 253 (2007).
119
Administrative Prohibition on “Bundling” Cases, MICH. L. W KLY .,
Aug. 9, 2006; see also Editorial, Unbundling Asbestos, W ALL ST . J., Aug. 21,
2006, at A10.
120
See OHIO R. CIV . P. 42(A)(2) (“In tort actions involving an asbestos
claim, . . . the court may consolidate pending actions for case management
purposes. For purposes of trial, the court may consolidate pending actions only
with the consent of all parties. Absent the consent of all parties, the court may
consolidate, for purposes of trial, only those pending actions relating to the same
exposed person and members of the exposed person’s household.”).
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the joinder of asbestos cases at trial unless all parties consent.121
These decisions are sound and should be followed. Apples and
bananas may mix in a fruit salad, but not in asbestos litigation.
2. Checklist Item #5: Assure discovery is proper for each
claim and defendant; if “form” discovery is used in
one’s jurisdiction, make sure it is appropriate and not
overly burdensome as applied in individual cases.
Some jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, use a standard form
for discovery in asbestos cases that requires each defendant to
respond to a sweeping set of interrogatories and production
requests within 90 or 120 days of being served.122 In the past,
these forms may have provided an effective and fair way to inject
efficiency into asbestos litigation. The traditional asbestos
defendants that were regularly named in asbestos litigation often
had this information readily available, as they likely produced
much of it in prior cases.
Broad-based discovery tools, however, can be inefficient,
unfair, and out-of-date when applied to newer defendants. For
companies that may only be peripherally connected, if at all, to the
alleged injury, responding to “one size fits all” standing discovery
orders can be unduly costly and burdensome. For example, in one
California case, Watts Regulator Companya valve
manufacturerwas named in a lawsuit where the plaintiff alleged
contact with one type of the company’s valves used on one day at
one location.123 Despite the narrow scope of the plaintiff’s claim,
the standing order required Watts to provide information on the
identity and composition of all asbestos-containing products made
or sold in a twelve year period, which reportedly amounted to
121

See KAN. ST . A NN . § 60-4902 (2006); TEX . C IV . PRAC. & REM .
CODE ANN . § 90.009 (Vernon 2005); G A. C ODE ANN . § 51-14-11 (2007).
122
In re Complex Asbestos Litig., No. 828684 (Cal. App. Dep’t. Super.
Ct. Jan. 1, 1997) (general order re : New Filings), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=10754 [hereinafter Gen. Order No.
129 Re: New Filings].
123
See Petition for Review, In re Complex Asbestos Litig. (Watts
Regulator Co.), No. 828864 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2007).
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almost 2,000 unique products with more than a million different
permutations.124
As this example illustrates, orders to compel the production of
substantial information that has no relevance to a case and will not
result in the discovery of admissible evidence can be highly
inappropriate. Assuming it is even possible to collect the
information in the time period allowed, as a practical matter,
companies would likely be coerced into settling claims regardless of
their merits just to avoid spending the considerable time, money
and resources it would take to comply with the standing order.
Trial courts should follow traditional litigation procedures and
only require defendants to produce information that is reasonably
related to a plaintiff’s specific allegations and is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in the
action.125 To the extent “form” discovery can still be a useful
litigation tool, it should be updated regularly to reflect the many
types of companies that are named in asbestos litigation and the
many types of cases that are being brought today. Trial courts
considering a form discovery order should seek input from the
plaintiff and defense communities before issuing such an order.
Courts also should allow objections by defendants to assure that a
form’s discovery provisions are not overly burdensome as applied
in individual cases.126
3. Checklist Item #6: Do Not Short-Circuit Trials.
Another trial management technique that should be avoided is
arbitrary time limits for defendants’ to present their cases. For
example, a San Francisco court recently limited the 124 defendants
124

See Petition for Review at 15, In re Complex Asbestos Litig. (Watts
Regulator Co.), No. 828864 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2007).
125
See, e.g., FED . R. C IV . P. 26(b)(1).
126
Under San Francisco Superior Court Order No. 129, a defendant may
not object that the information is not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence in the action and may not object that the
discovery is unduly burdensome, except that a defendant may assert a “onetime” burden objection in the first ninety days of the first suit against it. Gen.
Order No. 129 Re: New Filings, supra note 122.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FRONT LINES

623

named in an asbestos action to 45 total hours, which amounted to
thirty-six minutes per defendant to cross-examine plaintiffs and
present their own cases. Such a limitation denies defendants basic
procedural due process because their ability to mount a defense
“will be hampered or even eliminated through actions of others
over which these defendants have no control or lawful ability to
control.”127
D. Only Allow Claims Against Defendants Where There Is a
Legal Basis for Liability
Now in its fourth decade, the litigation has been sustained by
the plaintiffs’ bar search for new defendants coupled with new
theories of liability. As the litigation evolves, the connection to
asbestos-containing products is increasingly remote and the
liability connection more stretched.
The issue of whether a legal duty exists between an asbestos
plaintiff and a peripheral defendant who may have little or no
connection to the alleged injury is increasingly becoming a central
issue in the litigation. Unlike with most litigation, plaintiffs’
lawyers in asbestos cases are not selective in naming as defendants
only those companies that could have caused the harm. They
typically name scores of defendants regardless of their actual
connection to the plaintiff’s alleged injury. Nevertheless, as in
other tort cases, the plaintiff must still meet his or her burden of
proving that the defendant owed a legal duty before liability can be
imposed.128

127

See Written Opposition to Certain Trial Procedures in Violation of Due
Process at 2, Arts v. Asbestos Defendants, No. 417505 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
July 17, 2007).
128
Pulka v. Edelman, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. 1976), reargument
denied, 362 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. 1977).
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1. Checklist Item #7: Premises owners generally should owe
no duty to plaintiffs alleging harm from off-site,
secondhand exposure to asbestos.

A newer duty issue is whether a premises owner may be held
liable for injuries to workers’ family members who have been
exposed to asbestos off-site, typically through contact with a
directly exposed worker or that worker’s soiled work clothes.129 In
earlier years, the litigation was focused mostly on the
manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. Most of those
companies have been forced to seek bankruptcy court protection.
As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers began to target “peripheral
defendants,” including premises owners, for alleged harms to
independent contractors exposed to asbestos. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
are now targeting property owners for alleged harms to secondarily
exposed “peripheral plaintiffs.”
Since the beginning of 2005, a growing number of courts have
decided whether premises owners owe a duty to “take home”
exposure claimants. The duty has been rejected by the highest
courts in Georgia,130 New York,131 and Michigan;132 Texas133 and

129

See Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential New Frontier
in Asbestos Litigation: Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home” Exposure
Claims, 21:11 MEALEY ’S LITIG . R EP.: ASBESTOS 32 (July 5, 2006).
130
See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005).
131
See In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Holdampf v. A.C. & S.,
Inc.), 840 N.E.2d 115 (N.Y. 2005); see also In re Eighth Judicial Dist.
Asbestos Litig. (Rindfleisch v. AlliedSignal, Inc.), 12 Misc. 3d 936, 815
N.Y.S.2d 815 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 2006).
132
See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of
Texas (Miller v. Ford Motor Co.), 740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007).
133
See Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 2007 WL 2949524 (Tex. App. Oct. 11,
2007) (no duty owed because harm from non-occupational exposure to asbestos
was not reasonably foreseeable at time of plaintiff’s exposure); see also Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, 2007 WL 1174447 (Tex. App. Apr. 19, 2007)
(withdrawn Aug. 9, 2007) (premises owner owed no duty to an employee’s wife
injured by pre-1972 exposure to asbestos brought home on her husband’s work
clothing).
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Iowa134 appellate courts; a Delaware trial court,135 and a Kentucky
federal court.136 Earlier, a Maryland appellate court reached the
same conclusion.137 The New Jersey Supreme Court is the only
court of last resort to go the other way. 138 A few appellate courts
have found a duty to exist in some circumstances. 139
A broad new duty requirement for landowners would allow
plaintiffs’ lawyers to begin to name countless premises owners
directly in asbestos and other suits. As one commentator has
explained,
If the law becomes clear that premises-owners or
employers owe a duty to the family members of their
employees, the stage will be set for a major expansion in
premises liability. The workers’ compensation bar does not
apply to the spouses or children of employees, and so
allowing those family members to maintain an action against
the employer would greatly increase the number of
potential claimants. Moreover, people who claim to be
injured from take-home exposure, especially children, have
very appealing facts and tend to be much younger than
other claimants. These factors all flow together in support

134

See Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 2008 WL 141194 (Iowa Ct.
App. Jan. 16, 2008).
135
See In re Asbestos Litig. (Riedel v. ICI Americas, Inc.), 2007 WL
4571196 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished).
136
See Martin v. General Elec. Co., 2007 WL 2682064 (E.D. Ky. Sep. 5,
2007) (unpublished). As this article went to press, plaintiffs were appealing the
Martin ruling in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
137
See Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 705 A.2d 58 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1998).
138
See Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006).
139
See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation, Inc., 2007 WL 1159416 (Tenn.
App. Apr. 19, 2007), appeal granted (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007); Chaisson v.
Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2006); Zimko v. American
Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 2005), writ denied, 925 So. 2d 538 (La.
2006); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 2007 WL 2325214 (Wash. App.
Aug 13, 2007) (unpublished); Honer v. Ford Motor Co., 2007 WL 2985271
(Cal. App. Oct. 15, 2007); Condon v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2004 WL
1932847 (Cal. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
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of high values for these claims.140
The courts that have rejected a new duty rule for premises
owners have recognized that tort law must draw a line between the
competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to
everyone who is injured and of extending tort liability almost
without limit. As the Michigan Supreme Court explained,
“imposing a duty on a landowner to anybody who comes into
contact with somebody who has been on the landowner’s
property” would create “a potentially limitless pool of
plaintiffs.”141 Potential plaintiffs might include anyone who came
into contact with an exposed worker or his or her clothes, such as
co-workers, children living in the house, extended family members,
renters, house guests, baby-sitters, carpool members, bus drivers,
and workers at commercial enterprises visited by the worker when
he was dirty, as well as local laundry workers or others that
handled the worker’s clothes.
Trial courts would be wise to heed the concerns raised by the
high courts of Georgia, New York, and Michigan, and dismiss
premises owners from cases brought by persons exposed off-site.
2. Checklist Item #8: Maintain traditional tort law distinctions
for when premises owners can be liable for injuries to
contractors’ employees.
In asbestos litigation, the issue of landowner liability for harms
caused to contractors’ employees arises in two types of situations.
First, some personal injury lawyers have asserted liability against
landowners when the contractor was specifically hired to perform
140

st

Patrick M. Hanlon, Asbestos Litigation in the 21 Century:
Developments in Premises Liability Law in 2005, SL041 ALI-ABA 665, 694
(2005).
141
In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of
Texas, 740 N.W.2d at 200; see also Adams, 705 A.2d at 66 (“If liability for
exposure to asbestos could be premised on [decedent’s] handling of her
husband’s clothing, presumably Bethlehem [the premises owner] would owe a
duty to others who came into close contact with [decedent’s husband], including
other family members, automobile passengers, and co-workers. Bethlehem owed
no duty to strangers based upon providing a safe workplace for employees.”).
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the work that caused the injury—in this case, working with
products that contained asbestos.142 The Nevada Supreme Court,
however, ruled in Knutson v. Battle Mountain Gold Co.143 that a
premises owner does not owe such a duty of care to contractors’
employees144 because the independent contractor is in a better
position than the premises owner to take special precautions to
protect against any peculiar damages associated with working on
the premises. 145 The Delaware Supreme Court echoed that
sentiment: “If the independent contractor, through its work, causes
the condition that might otherwise give rise to landowner
liability . . . employees of that independent contractor have no
basis to claim that the landowner is liable for injuries resulting from
that condition.”146
Second, a contractor’s employee may sue a landowner for
asbestos related exposures resulting from work of another
independent contractor on the same premises. The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, ruled that landowners cannot be liable
“solely because they knew of the existence of a latent hazard on
their premises.”147 Rather, two additional elements must be shown:
“ignorance of the latent hazard on the part of the contractor and its
employees and the failure to warn of the latent condition or to take
other appropriate action.”148 The California Supreme Court has
142

See, e.g., Knutson v. Battle Mountain, Gold Co., No. 46504 (Nev. July
20, 2007) (Order of Affirmance).
143
Id.
144
See also General Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579 (Ky. 2007);
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 2007 WL 2458027 (Tex. Aug. 31,
2007), petition for reh’g filed (Nov. 19, 2007).
145
See Knutson, No. 46504, at 4 (internal citations omitted).
146
In re Asbestos Litig., 897 A.2d 767 (table), 2006 WL 1214980 (Del.
Apr 12, 2006) (unpublished); see also In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 1651964
(Del. Super. May 31, 2007) (unpublished), aff’d sub nom. Wenke v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours and Co., 2008 WL 187940 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2008); In re
Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 1651968 (Del. Super. June 25, 2007) (unpublished).
147
In re Asbestos Litig., 2006 WL 1214980, at *2.
148
Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and
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supported these principles, remanding a case for a new trial so that
jury instructions could reflect that “the hirer/landowner who has
not retained control over the work, and who was not itself actually
on notice of a concealed hazardous condition that causes injury,
should not be derivatively or vicariously liable for injuries
contemporaneously inflicted by an independent contractor on
another contractor’s employee.”149 That court found it persuasive
“that reasonable safety precautions against the hazard of asbestos
were readily available, such as wearing an inexpensive
respirator.”150 Trial courts should follow these well-reasoned
decisions.
3. Checklist Item #9: Component part manufacturers should
not be held liable for alleged asbestos-related hazards in
external or replacement parts made, supplied, or
installed by others and affixed post-manufacture.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have also begun naming manufacturers of
non-asbestos components (typically pumps and valves) in product
liability actions alleging that the component part maker had a duty
to warn of hazards in asbestos-containing components or finished
products made by others.151 These claims should be dismissed; it is
well established “[a]s a general rule, [that] component sellers
should not be liable when the component itself is not defective.”152
This rule was embodied in the Restatement, Third, Products
Liability and has been found to apply even where the supplier
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 343 (1965).
149
Kinsman v. Unocal Corp., 123 P.3d 931, 945 (Cal. 2005).
150
Id. at 939.
151
See Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 151 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App.
2007), review granted, No. 80251-3 (Wash. Jan. 8, 2008); Simonetta v. Viad
Corp., 151 P.3d 1019 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007), review granted, No. 80076-6
(Wash. Jan. 8, 2008).
152
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 (1997); see
also Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 591 N.E.2d 222 (N.Y. 1992).
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knew its product may be integrated into a finished product that
may cause harm.153 The reporters of the Restatement chose their
rules based on public policy rather than numbers of cases or bias
toward any party.
To place a duty to warn on a defendant for harms caused by
others’ products, or the use of others’ products, is contrary to two
long-standing tort law principles: (1) that economic loss should
ultimately be borne by the one who caused it, and (2) that the
manufacturer of a particular product is in the best position to warn
about risks associated with it. As the Restatement (Third)
Products Liability explains, “[i]f the component is not itself
defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability
solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated
product utilizes the component in a manner that renders the
integrated product defective.”154
Furthermore, expanding liability for failure to warn under these
circumstances would be “untenable and unmanageable.”155 Such a
duty rule would lead to “legal and business chaosevery product
supplier would be required to warn of the foreseeable dangers of
numerous other manufacturers’ products. . . .”156 “For example, a
syringe manufacturer would be required to warn of the danger of
any and all drugs it may be used to inject, and the manufacturer of
bread would be required to warn of peanut allergies, as a peanut
butter and jelly sandwich is a foreseeable use of bread.”157
Packaging companies might be held liable for hazards regarding
contents made by others. There are many other examples that
153

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a
illus. 1 (1997); see also Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995), appeal denied, 562 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. 1997).
154
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a
(1997).
155
Thomas W. Tardy III & Laura A. Frase, Liability of Equipment
Manufacturers for Products of Another: Is Relief in Sight?, HARRISMARTIN
COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, May 2007, at 6.
156
John W. Petereit, The Duty Problem With Liability Claims Against
One Manufacturer for Failing to Warn About Another Manufacturer’s Product,
T OXIC T ORTS & ENV ’ TL L. 7 (Defense Research Inst. Toxic Torts & Env’tl L.
Comm. Winter 2005).
157
Tardy & Frase, supra note 155, at 6.
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could be provided.
Consumer safety also could be undermined by the potential for
over-warning (the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” problem) and through
conflicting information on different components and finished
products.158
E. Only Allow a Defendant To Be Held Liable If Its Conduct or
Product Was a Legal Cause of the Alleged Injury
For issues relating to both general and specific causation, courts
should require that plaintiffs provide precise and credible
allegations against each defendant early in the litigation and exercise
their judicial responsibility to require the application of wellgrounded science in causation arguments.159 General causation
exists when a substance can cause an injury or condition in the
general population; specific causation exists when the substance is
the cause of a specific person’s injury.160 Unlike some
environmental contamination cases, there is no defined incident of
exposure, and the latency period can take several decades.161 This
158

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §5 cmt. a.
(1997); Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace:
The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 U. C IN . L.
REV . 38, 43 (1983) (“The extension of workplace warnings liability unguided
by practical considerations has the unreasonable potential to impose absolute
liability. . . .”).
159
See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.
1997) (in toxic tort cases, a plaintiff has a burden of showing both general
causation—that the substance the plaintiff was allegedly exposed to can generally
cause the condition claimed—and specific causation—that the specific exposure
was a substantial cause of the specific harm).
160
Id. at 714; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey, 187 S.W.3d 265, 270
(Tex. App. 2006) (“Proving one type of causation does not necessarily prove
the other, and both are needed in situations where direct, reliable medical testing
for specific causation has not taken place.”).
161
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AGENCY FOR TOXIC
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY , ASBESTOS TOXICITY: W HAT RESPIRATORY
CONDITIONS ARE ASSOCIATED W ITH ASBESTOS?, available at http://www.atsdr.
cdc.gov/csem/asbestos/respiratory_changes2.html (observing latency periods of
ten to fifty years).
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circumstance is partly why “most plaintiffs sue every known
manufacturer of asbestos products,”162 notwithstanding the
plaintiff’s marginal contact, if any, with a particular defendant’s
product. It is incumbent on trial courts, therefore, to dismiss
defendants where causation cannot be established and instruct
jurors on how to make appropriate causation decisions.163
1. Checklist Item #10: Make gatekeeper decisions on expert
testimony and assure that materials experts rely on
actually support their opinions.
Trial courts should hold preliminary hearings to scrutinize the
reliability of expert opinions and to determine whether there is a
risk of disease associated with a particular asbestos exposure.
There are different types, length and concentrations of asbestos
fibers,164 and plaintiffs’ lawyers are increasing the number of
162

Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162 (4th Cir.

1986).
163

In some cases, especially where the plaintiffs are sympathetic, courts
have relaxed specific causation requirements to allow a case to go to trial or to
encourage settlement. The ability to recover absent proof of causation is
considered by many legal observers to be a key cause of the rapid expansion in
recent years of claims alleging asbestos-related injuries. See Steven Hantler,
Toward Greater Judicial Leadership on Asbestos Litigation, CIVIL JUSTICE
FORUM, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, Apr. 2003, at 6–8
(“[D]uring the course of discovery some of the defendants are dismissed on
motions for summary judgment because there has been no evidence of any
contact with any of such defendants’ asbestos-containing products. Other
defendants may be required to go to trial but succeed at the verdict stage.”); but
see Pearson v. Garlock Sealing Tech., No. 2001-297 (Tex. Dist. Ct. order Jan.
25, 2005) (granting defendant’s summary judgment motion because plaintiff’s
expert testimony attempting to link Garlock’s gaskets to plaintiff’s peritoneal
mesothelioma failed to satisfy admissibility standards). HarrisMartin reported
that Pearson’s settlements with other defendants totaled an estimated $20
million. See Texas Judge Awards Garlock Summary Judgment in Mesothelioma,
HARRISMARTIN ’S COLUMNS: ASBESTOS, Feb. 2005, at 12.
164
See, e.g., Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum Auto Parts, Inc., 649 A.2d
613, 620 (N.J. 1994) (trial court erred in instructing jury that all asbestoscontaining friction products without warnings are defective as a matter of law:
“Our courts have acknowledged that asbestos-containing products are not
uniformly dangerous and thus that courts should not treat them all alike.”);
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diseases they claim are asbestos-related.165
One particularly helpful tool is the epidemiological study. For
example, as discussed later in this section, some experts claim that
it may only take one fiber to cause certain asbestos-related
ailments, including mesothelioma.166 In comparing this claim to
epidemiological studies, an Ohio federal judge in Bartel v. John
Crane, Inc.167 ruled that testimony alleging “that every breath
[plaintiff] took which contained asbestos could have been a
substantial factor in causing his disease, is not supported by the
medical literature.”168 The court said that it would accord “less
weight” to that testimony. 169
Where consistent, significant, and clear epidemiology exists, as
in Bartel, courts have begun scrutinizing and, when appropriate,
rejecting expert opinions that contradict those studies.170 Carefully
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Tex. law) (“[A]ll asbestos-containing products cannot be lumped together in
determining their dangerousness.”); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d
533, 538 (Fla. 1985) (“Asbestos products . . . have widely divergent toxicities,
with some asbestos products presenting a much greater risk of harm than
others.”).
165
See Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL ’ Y 1117
(2007).
166
See infra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
167
316 F. Supp. 2d 603 (N.D. Ohio 2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v.
A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005).
168
Id. at 611.
169
Id.
170
See, e.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 885–86
(10th Cir. 2005) (“This is not a case where there is no epidemiology. It is a
case where the body of epidemiology largely finds no association between
silicone breast implants and immune system diseases. . . . We are unable to find
a single case in which a differential diagnosis that is flatly contrary to all of the
available epidemiological evidence is both admissible and sufficient to defeat a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.”); Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102
F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) (numerous reputable epidemiology studies
contradicted plaintiffs’ theory); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,
1316 (11th Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs’ “proffered conclusions . . . were out of sync
with the conclusions in the overwhelming majority of the epidemiological
studies presented to the court.”); Chambers v. Exxon Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d
661, 665 (M.D. La. 2000) (causation claim contradicted by “a number of
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conducted pre-trial judicial “gatekeeper” hearings can bring these
and other important causation issues to light and reduce the
likelihood that liability can be based on speculative or discredited
testimony.
2. Checklist Item #11: Adhere to traditional elements of
substantial factor causation at summary judgment and
provide clear jury instructions as to whether a particular
defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in
causing the alleged harm.
In cases where a plaintiff alleges multiple sources of exposures,
which occurs regularly in asbestos litigation, courts must compare
exposures to determine whether a particular source was a
“substantial factor” in causing the alleged injury.171 When a
defendant’s product could not have been a substantial factor in
causing the claimed injury, the defendant must be dismissed—even
when the defendant’s conduct could have been a “negligible” or
“insubstantial” cause of the injury. 172 For example, if there is clear
evidence of long-term, substantial exposure to asbestos from one or
more sources, incidental exposures cannot be deemed to be
substantial causes of the alleged disease.173
scientifically performed studies which demonstrate no association” between
benzene and CML), aff’d, 247 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2001).
171
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965). The term
“substantial cause” is sometimes referred to as a “substantial contributing
cause” or a “substantial factor in.”
172
Id. at § 431 cmt. d (“While it is necessary to the existence of liability
for negligence that the defendant’s negligent conduct be a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, this of itself is not necessarily conclusive. There
are certain rules which operate to relieve a negligent actor from liability because
of the manner in which his negligence produces it, even though his negligent
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing it about. These rules are stated in §§
435–453.”).
173
See id. at cmt. a (“The word ‘substantial’ is used to denote the fact that
the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead
reasonable men to regard it as a cause . . . rather than in the so-called
‘philosophical sense’ which includes every one of the great number of events
without which any happening would not have occurred.”).
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“The most frequently used test for causation in asbestos cases
is the ‘frequency-regularity-proximity test’ announced in
Lohrmann.”174 In Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,175 the
Fourth Circuit formulated this test in determining whether a
specific asbestos product contributed to, or was a substantial cause
of, the plaintiff’s injuries.176 The plaintiff, having gone to trial
against seven asbestos product manufacturers, had argued that if he
could “present any evidence that a company’s asbestos-containing
product was at the workplace while the plaintiff was at the
workplace, a jury question has been established as to whether that
product contributed as a proximate cause to the plaintiff’s
disease.”177 The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument, and adopted
the rule employed by the district court judge, providing that
whether a plaintiff could get to the jury (or defeat a motion for
summary judgment) “would depend upon the frequency of the use
of the product and the regularity or extent of the plaintiff’s
employment in proximity thereto.”178 Many courts have applied
the Lohrmann (or a Lohrmann-like) causation standard.179
174

Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1991)
(applying Lohrmann to an asbestos claim governed by Texas law).
175
782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986).
176
See id. at 1163.
177
Id. at 1162.
178
Id.
179
See, e.g., Gregg v. V.J. Auto Parts, Inc., 2007 WL 4557811, *9 (Pa.
Dec. 28, 2007); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 323 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007),
reh’g denied (Oct. 12, 2007); Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 724
(S.C. 2007); Gorman-Rupp Co. v. Hall, 908 So. 2d 749 (Miss. 2005);
Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 2005); Chavers v. General
Motors Corp., 79 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2002); Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co.,
994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Ark. law); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v.
Balbos, 604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); Thacker v. UNR Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d
449 (Ill. 1992); Vaughn v. Ford Motor Co., 91 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App. 2002)
(applying Ill. law); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854
(Iowa 1994); Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988),
appeal denied, 553 A.2d 968 and 553 A.2d 969 (Pa. 1988); Robertson v.
Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pa. law); James v.
Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998); Sholtis v. American
Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196, 1207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) Jones
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 69 F.3d 712 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying N.C.
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Accordingly, a trial court should carefully evaluate the potential
culpability of named defendants and dismiss those defendants
where the plaintiff has not put forth sufficient facts to support a
“frequency, regularity, proximity test” at summary judgment.180
For claims that go to trial, courts should instruct the jury that in
order to find against a specific defendant, a plaintiff alleging
multiple exposure sources must present evidence (1) of exposure to
a “specific product” attributable to the defendant, (2) “on a regular
basis over some extended period of time,” (3) “in proximity to
where the plaintiff actually worked,” (4) such that it is probable
that the exposure to the defendant’s product caused plaintiff’s
injuries.181
Importantly, courts should avoid suggestions that substantial
cause should be characterized in terms of risk. Some personal
injury lawyers and their experts have suggested that it should be
sufficient that a defendant’s exposure is a substantial factor in the
risk of asbestos disease.182 This mistaken notion arose from a
California Supreme Court opinion adopting the substantial cause
test because the court, perhaps unintentionally, equated risk with
cause.183 California courts that have followed this path have
law); Chism v. W.R. Grace & Co., 158 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
Mo. law); Kraus v. Celotex Corp., 925 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(applying Mo. law); Lyons v. Garlock, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Kan.
1998) (applying Kan. law); Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488 (10th
Cir. 1990) (applying Okla. law); Blackston v. Shook and Fletcher Insulation
Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Ga. law).
The Lohrmann causation standard also is the law in a number of states that
have enacted medical criteria requirements for asbestos cases. See OHIO REV .
CODE ANN. § 2307.96(B), FLA . STAT . A NN. §§ 774.203(30)-204 (applying to
certain claims); G A. C ODE ANN . § 51-14-3(23).
180
See Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005)
(applying the frequency, regularity, and proximity test and finding that the
plaintiff did not establish that most of the named defendants had any exposure to
the products).
181
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1162–63 (4th
Cir. 1986).
182
See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 897.
183
See Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal.
1997) (“[T]he plaintiff may meet the burden of proving that exposure to
defendant’s product was a substantial factor causing the illness by showing that
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reduced California’s causation standard to a minimal threshold;
essentially allowing a claim to be based on any exposure that “is
not negligible, theoretical, or infinitesimal.”184 Being a substantial
risk is not the same as being a substantial factor in the cause of
asbestos disease and, therefore, is contrary to the doctrines set
forth in the Restatement (Second) and in Lohrmann, as well as
sound science.185 Trial courts in California and elsewhere should
avoid weakening this fundamental concept in tort law that a
defendant, in order to be deemed liable, must have had some part—
and in these cases a substantial one—in actually causing the
plaintiff’s harm.
3. Checklist Item #12: Assure specific and adequate product
identification by dismissing cases where product
identification is not sufficient.
Because of the practice of naming scores, sometimes hundreds,
of defendants, product identification can be particularly weak, such
as the vague recollection by a co-worker that a particular
defendant’s product was at a workplace.186 Trial courts,
consequently, should and do regularly dismiss defendants at
summary judgment for lack of proper product identification.187
Discovery requests and subsequent summary judgment motions
from individual defendants should be permitted early in the process
in reasonable medical probability it was a substantial factor contributing to the
plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing cancer.”) (emphasis added).
184
See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 897.
185
See Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 942, 961 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (“Establishing that the risk of causation
‘is not zero’ falls woefully short of the degree of proof required by Daubert and
its progeny.”).
186
See, e.g., Campbell ex rel. Estate of Campbell v. Flintkote Co., No.
1298 May. Term 1997, 93 Oct. Term 1998, 2000 WL 33711047, at *4 (Pa.
Com. Pl. Nov. 7, 2000) (“[V]ague and oftentimes uncertain assertions . . . [are]
not enough for the Plaintiff to sustain her burden.”).
187
See, e.g., id.; Smith v. A-Best Prods. Co., No. 94-CA-2309, 1996 WL
80533, at *4 (Ohio App. 4 Dist. Feb. 20, 1996) (holding that plaintiff must
prove exposure to each defendant’s product and that the product was a
substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injury).
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so that defendants, especially peripheral defendants, are not
pressured to engage in “nuisance” settlements to avoid the costs of
defending the litigation.
Trial courts should adhere to the traditional tort law principle
that a plaintiff must be able to identify a particular manufacturer as
a cause of the alleged injuries.188 It is insufficient to establish the
mere presence of asbestos in the workplace. At minimum, a
plaintiff must show a specific defendant’s asbestos product was
used near where the plaintiff worked. As a Philadelphia trial court
wrote: “[A plaintiff] must prove that he worked in the vicinity of
the product’s use. . . . Product identity can be established where
the record shows that plaintiff inhaled asbestos fibers shed by that
manufacturer’s specific product.”189
Some states consider product identification as part of the
Lohrmann substantial factor analysis. 190 For example, the
Mississippi Supreme Court held, “the proper test to be used is the
frequency, regularity, and proximity standard to show product
identification of the defendants’ actual products, exposure of the
plaintiffs to those products, and proximate causation as to the
injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.”191
4. Checklist Item #13: Issue disease-specific causation
requirements for mesothelioma, lung cancer and other
asbestos-related cancers.
a. Mesothelioma
Mesothelioma cases can be the most challenging for trial courts
and juries because the plaintiffs can be particularly sympathetic.
Notwithstanding the desire to assist those with this deadly form of
188

See Eckenrod v. GAF Corp., 544 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(“The mere fact that [defendant’s] asbestos products came into the facility does
not show that the decedent ever breathed these specific asbestos products or that
he worked where these asbestos products were delivered.”).
189
Campbell, 2000 WL 33711047, at *2 (internal citations omitted).
190
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Hall, 912 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 2005).
191
Id. at 137.
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cancer, it is important that plaintiffs’ lawyers only seek recovery
from those whose products may have caused the disease. One
theory that plaintiffs’ lawyers and their experts have used to
expand the pool of potential defendants, as alluded to above, is the
so-called “any fiber” theory. 192 The single fiber theory suggests
that any exposure to asbestos, regardless of quantity, duration or
frequency, contributes to the development of asbestos disease.193
This theory has been increasingly scrutinized by the courts
because, according to epidemiological studies and leading scientific
experts, the theory violates the fundamental toxicology tenet that
dose makes the poison. 194
For example, in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 195 the Texas
Supreme Court rejected the “single fiber” theory, holding that in
order to prove causation, a plaintiff must show “[d]efendantspecific evidence relating to the approximate dose to which the
plaintiff was exposed, coupled with evidence that the dose was a
substantial factor in causing the asbestos-related disease.”196 The
trial judge responsible for administering the Texas asbestos docket
agreed, stating that the single fiber theory “confuses the difference
between a potential cause and a substantial cause, and encourages
speculation on how little exposure, and how infrequently the
exposure must take place, before causation can be said to have been
proven.”197
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently rejected
192

See Mark A. Behrens & William L. Anderson, The “Any Exposure”
Theory: An Unsound Basis for Asbestos Causation and Expert Testimony,
_ S W . U. L. R EV . _ (forthcoming 2008).
193
Bartel v. John Crane, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (N.D. Ohio
2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th
Cir. 2005).
194
See generally, David L. Eaton, Scientific Judgment and Toxic Torts— A
Primer in Toxicology for Judges and Lawyers, 12 J.L. & POL ’ Y 5, 15 (2003)
(“The relationship between dose and effect (dose-response relationship) is the
hallmark of basic toxicology.”).
195
232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. 2007), reh’g denied (Oct. 12, 2007).
196
Id. at 773.
197
Letter from Judge Mark Davidson, 11th District Court, Texas, to
Counsel, In re Asbestos, No. 2004-3, 964, at *3 (July 18, 2007) (on file with the
Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law & Policy).
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the any exposure theory in Gregg v. V.J. Auto Parts, Inc.198 Gregg
involved allegations that personal car repair work on brakes and
gaskets caused plaintiff’s mesothelioma, resulting in a lawsuit
against the auto parts store that sold Mr. Gregg the parts he used.
The primary holding in the case dealt with the application of the
“frequency, proximity, and regularity” test, but in the course of the
discussion the Court majority expressed a clear rejection of the any
exposure approach:
We recognize that it is common for plaintiffs to submit
expert affidavits attesting that any exposure to asbestos, no
matter how minimal, is a substantial contributing factor in
asbestos disease. However, we share Judge Klein’s
perspective, as expressed in the Summers [v. Certainteed
Corp., 886 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. 2005)] decision, that such
generalized opinions do not suffice to create a jury question
in a case where exposure to the defendant’s product is de
minimis, particularly in the absence of evidence excluding
other possible sources of exposure (or in the face of
evidence of substantial exposure from other sources). As
Judge Klein explained, one of the difficulties courts face in
the mass tort cases arises on account of a willingness on the
part of some experts to offer opinions that are not fairly
grounded in a reasonable belief concerning the underlying
facts and/or opinions that are not couched within accepted
scientific methodology. 199
While recognizing the occasional difficulty of proving which of
plaintiff’s exposures contributed to the disease, Pennsylvania’s
highest court nevertheless rejected the easy way out of simply
stating that all exposures are responsible:
[W]e do not believe that it is a viable solution to indulge in a
fiction that each and every exposure to asbestos, no matter
how minimal in relation to other exposures, implicates a
fact issue concerning substantial-factor causation in every
“direct-evidence” case. The result, in our view, is to subject
defendants to full joint-and-several liability for injuries and
198
199

No. 38 EAP 2005, 2007 WL 4557811 (Pa. Dec. 28, 2007).
Id. at **8 (internal citations omitted).
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fatalities in the absence of any reasonably developed
scientific reasoning that would support the conclusion that
the product sold by the defendant was a substantial factor
in causing the harm.200
In the last three years, a growing number of other courts in
multiple jurisdictions have excluded or criticized any exposure
causation testimony, either as unscientific under a
Daubert201/Frye202 analysis or as insufficient to support causation.
This pattern of decisions includes:
• a Texas appellate court in a mesothelioma case rejecting
testimony that any dry wall exposures above 0.1
fibers/cc year would be a substantial contributing
factor;203
• an Ohio federal district court and the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in a gasket and packings case;204
• two Pennsylvania state trial judges rejecting the any
exposure testimony in mechanic cases and another
criticizing the theory’s application in a pleural disease
case;205
• a federal bankruptcy court in litigation involving

200
201
202
203

Id. at **9.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens, 239 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.

2007).
204

See Bartel v. John Crane, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (N.D. Ohio
2004), aff’d sub nom. Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th
Cir. 2005).
205
See In re Toxic Substance Cases (Vogelsberger v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.),
2006 WL 2404008, *7–8 (Pa. Com. Pl., Allegheny County, Aug. 17, 2006)
(holding expert’s “any fiber” opinion inadmissible under Frye standard), on
appeal sub nom. Betz v. Pneumo-Abex, LLC, No. 1058 WDA 2006 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2007); Basile v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., No.
11484 CD 2005, slip op. at 8–12 (Pa. Com. Pl. Feb. 22, 2007) (precluding
expert from testifying that “all asbestos exposures substantially contributed to
and caused the Plaintiff Decedent’s mesothelioma”); Summers v. Certainteed
Corp., 886 A.2d 240, 244 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal granted, 897 A.2d 460
(Pa. 2006).
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asbestos in vermiculite insulation;206
• a Mississippi appellate court that rejected a medical
monitoring class for persons allegedly exposed in a
school building;207 and
• a Washington trial court decision rejecting an any
exposure opinion in a heavy equipment mechanic
case.208
These decisions are sound, as a matter of law and science, and
should be adopted elsewhere.
One complicating factor in mesothelioma cases is that, while
mesothelioma is generally associated with asbestos exposure, it has
been estimated that between ten and twenty percent of all
mesothelioma patients contract their disease from non-asbestos
sources.209 At this point the cause of these illnesses is unknown.210
Nevertheless, it clearly would be inappropriate for courts to allow
plaintiff’s lawyers to pursue litigation under the theory that
asbestos exposure must have caused a plaintiff’s mesothelioma.
Courts must require causation standards to be met.
b. Lung Cancer
The key issue for courts with lung cancer cases is to distinguish
between lung cancers caused by asbestos exposure and those from
other causes. The plaintiff must “offer competent evidence that
asbestos exposure, more likely than not, caused [plaintiff’s] lung
cancer, and also to negate with reasonable certainty [plaintiff’s]
heavy smoking history as the other plausible cause of his lung
cancer.”211
In cases involving heavy smokers, plaintiffs’ lawyers have tried
to get around this task by suggesting that there is a synergistic
206

See In re W.R. Grace & Co., 355 B.R. 462, 474, 478 (Bankr. D. Del.
2006), leave to appeal denied, 2007 WL 1074094 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2007).
207
See Brooks v. Stone Arch., P.A., 934 So. 2d 350 (Miss. App. 2006).
208
Anderson v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., No. 05-2-04551-5SEA (Wash.
Super. Oct. 31, 2006) (Transcript of bench ruling at 144–45).
209
See Sporn & Roggli, supra note 88, at 108.
210
See id.
211
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey, 187 S.W.3d 265, 271 (Tex. App. 2006).
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effect between smoking and asbestos exposure in causing lung
cancer.212 Under such a theory, asbestos can cause lung cancer even
where the plaintiff does not have asbestosis. 213 As a Texas
appellate court held in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bailey,214 trial courts
should not admit expert testimony asserting these theories because
they have not been shown to be relevant and reliable.215 With such
novel scientific theories of causation, “[c]areful exploration and
explication of what is reliable scientific methodology in a given
context is necessary.”216 Smoking and other potential causes for
lung cancer, therefore, must be accounted for in cases alleging lung
cancer from asbestos-related exposures.
c. Other Forms of Cancer
Personal injury lawyers also have filed asbestos-related claims
for more general types of cancer, such as cancers of the colon,
kidney, rectum, larynx, stomach, pharynx and esophagus.217 Courts
adhering to Daubert, Frye or other such sound scientific screening
standards should reject these claims because the science does not
support a causal link between asbestos and these other cancers.218
With regard to colon cancer, for example, some cases have been
filed where asbestos bodies and fibers have been found in the
plaintiff’s colon.219 Presence of asbestos fibers, however, does not

212

See id.
See id.
214
See id.
215
See id. at 271–72.
216
Id. at 274 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d
706, 719 (Tex. 1997)).
217
See Jonathan M. Samet, Asbestos and Causation of Non-Respiratory
Cancers: Evaluation by the Institute of Medicine, 15 J.L. & POL ’ Y 1117
(2007).
218
See Letter from Dr. James D. Crapo to U.S. Sen. Jon Kyl (July 23,
2003), in S. Rep. No. 108-118, at 148 (“Compensation by the FAIR Act for
forms of cancer other than lung cancer and mesothelioma is not justified by
current medical science.”).
219
See Alani Golanski, General Causation at a Crossroads in Toxic Tort
Cases, 108 PENN ST . L. R EV . 479, 491–96 (2003).
213
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create a causal relationship between those fibers and any cancer.220
The Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, which has
published the broadest look into theories of causal relationships
between selected cancers, including colon cancer, and asbestos,
found that there is “not sufficient [evidence] to infer a causal
relationship between asbestos exposure and colorectal cancer.”221
Accordingly, courts applying sound scientific principles have
rejected these claims.222
As discussed above, epidemiological studies can be an
important tool for courts in assessing such new theories of
causation. Again, in the context of colon cancer, a number of
epidemiologists and medical organizations have expressly
determined that asbestos exposure does not cause colon cancer.223
For example, one study in the Los Angeles area concluded
“occupational exposure to asbestos is not a risk factor for colon
cancer.”224 Similarly, a 2004 study found that “[c]urrent
epidemiology does not support the link between asbestos exposure
and adenocarcinoma of the colon.”225 Yet, some personal injury
220

Id.
INST. OF MED . COMM. ON ASBESTOS: SELECTED HEALTH EFFECTS,
ASBESTOS: SELECTED CANCERS (NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 2006) (“The
overall lack of consistency or of the suggestion of an association among the casecontrolled studies (even those of the highest quality) and the absence of
convincing dose-response relationships in either type of study design, however
weigh against causality.”).
222
See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 827 F. Supp. 1014,
1037–50 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting judgment as a matter of law on the ground
that epidemiological studies failed to demonstrate a sufficiently strong and
consistent association between asbestos and colon cancer); Washington v.
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 839 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
expert testimony that plaintiff’s colon cancer “could have been due to asbestos
exposure lacked probative value because it was pure speculation based on
negative inferences”); but see Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp. 591 A.2d 671,
675–77 (N.J. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing grant of summary judgment on these
grounds).
223
See, e.g., David H. Garabrant et al., Asbestos and Colon Cancer: Lack
of Association in a Large Case-Control Study, 135(8) AM. J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 843–53 (1992).
224
Id.
225
Sporn & Roggli, supra note 88, at 108.
221
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lawyers continue to file these cases.226 When such novel theories of
causation are proffered, courts should perform their gatekeeper
function to reject them unless and until credible science can
establish such a link.
F. Assure That Juries Can Fully Compensate Deserving
Plaintiffs While Preserving Assets For Future Claimants
1. Checklist Item #14: Permit discovery of settlement trust
claims, as well as any pre-trial settlements, and declare
intentions to file any future claims.
Ohio trial court Judge Harry Hanna showed the importance of
allowing defendants to seek discovery of claim forms that a
plaintiff’s lawyers had previously submitted to settlement
trusts. 227 In Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,228 he “exposed
one of the darker corners of tort abuse” in asbestos litigation:
inconsistencies between allegations made in open court and those
submitted to settlement trusts or other funds set up by bankrupt
companies to pay asbestos-related claims.229
As the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported, “[Judge] Hanna’s
order effectively opened a Pandora’s box of deceit . . . Documents
from the six other compensation claims revealed that [plaintiff’s
lawyers] presented conflicting versions of how Kananian acquired
his cancer.”230 In addition, emails and other documents from the
226

See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Answer to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendant, Honeywell Int’l (Allied Signal/Bendix), Larson v. Honeywell Int’l
Corp., No. 3627 (Pa. Com. Pl. filed Mar. 30, 2007).
227
See Kananian v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., No. CV 412750 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Jan. 18, 2007) (order and opinion).
228
Id.
229
Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, W ALL ST . J., Jan. 22, 2007, at
A14; see also Paul Davies, Plaintiffs’ Team Takes Hit on Asbestos, W ALL ST .
J., Jan. 20, 2007, at A4; Thomas J. Sheeran, Ohio Judge Bans Calif. Lawyer
in Asbestos Lawsuit, C IN . POST , Feb. 20, 2007, at A3; Editorial, Going Too
Far, C OLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 2007, at 8A.
230
James F. McCarty, Judge Becomes National Legal Star; Bars Firm
Form Court Over Deceit, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 25, 2007, at B1
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plaintiff’s attorneys showed that “the client has accepted monies
from entities to which he was not exposed,” and one settlement
trust form was “completely fabricated.”231 In all, Mr. Kananian
reportedly collected $700,000 from trusts and settlements. 232 The
Wall Street Journal has editorialized that Judge Hanna’s opinion
should be “required reading for other judges” to assist in providing
“more scrutiny of ‘double dipping’ and the rampant fraud inherent
in asbestos trusts.”233
Other courts have recognized the discoverability of claim forms
submitted by plaintiffs to asbestos-related bankruptcy trusts.234 In
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Superior Court, for example, a
California appellate court issued a writ of mandamus, stating that it
would be an unjustifiable denial of discovery for the trial court to
not allow defendants to discover documents submitted to
bankruptcy trusts by the plaintiff’s attorney in support of the
plaintiff’s claims to those trusts for compensation for the alleged
asbestos-related injuries.235 Likewise, Texas trial courts are granting
(“In one claim, the lawyers said Kananian had been exposed to asbestos while
working as a welder around insulated pipes. In another claim they said he
welded for only two weeks while on a ship in the Philippines. In a third claim,
the lawyers said the victim had been exposed to asbestos at the San Francisco
Naval Shipyard at a time when Kananian testified he was a rifleman who merely
had passed through the port on board a troopship.”).
231
Lorillard Tobacco Co.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to
Disqualify Chris Andreas and the Brayton Purcell Firm, Kananian v. Lorillard
Tobacco Co., No. 442750, 2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga County Nov. 13,
2006).
232
See Kimberley A. Strassel, Trusts Busted, W ALL ST . J., Dec. 5, 2006,
at A18.
233
Editorial, Cuyahoga Comeuppance, W ALL ST . J., Jan. 22, 2007, at
A14; see also Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, 178:4 FORBES 136 (Sept. 4,
2006).
234
See Strassel, supra note 232, at A18; see also Skonberg v. OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp., 576 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 580
N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991); In re New York City Asbestos Litig. (Negrepont v.
A.C. & S, Inc.), No. 120894/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. City Dec. 11, 2003)
(hearing transcript); Drabczyk v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 2005-1535 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Erie County Jan. 18, 2008).
235
139 Cal. App. 4th 1481 (2006); see also Seariver Maritime, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 2006 WL 2105431, at *5 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. July 28, 2006)
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motions to compel responses to interrogatories directed to asbestos
claimants regarding claims and settlements made or expected to be
made with any bankruptcy trust.236 In New Jersey, a discovery
master for the court overseeing that state’s consolidated asbestos
docket recommended that production of claim forms be directed,
explaining that, whether or not ultimately admissible in evidence,
such documents reveal discoverable factual information regarding
plaintiffs’ alleged exposure to asbestos-containing products. 237
Most recently, a New York trial court acted to head off
gamesmanship in filing practices by requiring plaintiff’s counsel to
file all claim forms that they intend to file within ninety days
before the start of trial, and produce such forms to defendants.238
The court cautioned that if plaintiff’s counsel ignored the order and
filed claim forms with bankruptcy trusts at a later date, the court
would “vacate any verdict if it is against the Defendant.”239
By allowing such discovery, and preventing gamesmanship,
courts can better prevent an unscrupulous claimant from trying to
tell one story to a bankruptcy trust and a different story to the
jury in a civil action. Transparency with respect to claim forms
also creates proper pressure on plaintiffs’ lawyers to file more
consistent and accurate bankruptcy trust claims.

(unpublished).
236
Duncan v. A.W. Chesterton, No. 2004-07671 (Tex. Harris County
Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2006) (“[T]he information as documents related to plaintiff’s
bankruptcy claims are discoverable.”); Brassfield v. Alcoa, No. 2006-08035
(Tex. Harris County Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2006) (“The Defendants are entitled to
production of the applications from the trusts in order to introduce them into
evidence at the trial of the case.”).
237
Szostak v. A-B Elec. Supply Co., No. L-12453-97 (Mass. Middlesex
County Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2006).
238
See Cannella v. Abex, Nos. 1037729/07, 105609/03, 105136/07,
107449/07, 104144/07, 106808/07, 117395/06, 116617/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. County Jan. 24, 2007) (hearing transcript).
239
Id. at 46.
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2. Checklist Item #15: Assure proper settlement credits and
offsets at trial with monies paid by any entity to satisfy a
legal claim directed at the injury alleged in accordance
with state law.
An important way to assure that litigation resources are
preserved for future claimants, while allowing current claimants to
be fully compensated, is to properly offset judgments with
settlement credits and trust receipts. Given the mass numbers of
defendants typically named in the litigation, the final sum of all
settlements is often substantial. In addition, as discussed in the
previous section, most plaintiffs also collect funds from
bankruptcy trusts in satisfaction of a claim outside of the litigation
process. With several large trusts coming online with assets totaling
$30 billion in 2007 and 2008,240 “[f]or the first time ever, trust
recoveries may fully compensate asbestos victims.”241
Trial courts should expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will try to
affect the off-set calculation. One tactic plaintiff’s lawyers have
used is to include in the settlements they reach with most
defendants that only a small portion, if any, of those settlements
will be used to off-set any judgment against the remaining
defendants; they will then argue that these side agreements should
“control the allocation of set-offs.”242 As can be expected, courts
have rejected these efforts because they “subvert the findings of
the trier of fact” in assessing liability. 243 Courts also have
recognized that plaintiffs and their lawyers have an undisputed
“interest in allocating as little as possible” of settlements to final
judgments.244
In addition, some plaintiffs’ lawyers have argued, as in New
240

See Strassel, supra note 232, at A18.
Charles E. Bates & Charles H. Mullin, Having Your Tort and Eating it
Too?, 6:4 MEALEY ’S ASBESTOS BANKR. R EP. 1 (Nov. 2006).
242
See Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 920 (discussing several ways
that plaintiffs’ attorneys in California have attempted to influence off-sets).
243
Jones v. John Crane, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 144, 158 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005).
244
Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 254 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
241
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York asbestos cases, that because of the automatic stay of litigation
against bankruptcy trusts, a plaintiff cannot obtain effective
jurisdiction over the trust and, consequently, monies received from
those trusts should not be included in the off-set calculations. 245
Judge Freedman, who oversees New York City’s asbestos docket,
has wisely rejected this argument, holding that the culpability of
tortfeasors who are bankrupt and, therefore, not a party to the
case, will be included when calculating a defendants’ liability under
New York law.246 The impact of this issue in asbestos litigation,
she recognized, “is especially pronounced, because of the large
number of potentially culpable parties that have filed for
bankruptcy.”247
In the face of these and similar efforts, trial courts must assure
that the controlling allocation formula is applied in ways that are
reasonable and fair.248

245

See In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 750 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472–73
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002).
246
Id. at 479.
247
Id. at 473.
248
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979) (“A payment
made by a tortfeasor or by a person acting for him to a person whom he has
injured is credited against his tort liability, as are payments made by another
who is, or believes he is, subject to the same tort liability.”); see also Burns v.
Stouffer, 100 N.E. 2d 507 (Ill. Ct. App. 1951) (holding that it is reversible error
not to credit an amount received from a joint tortfeasor); see generally Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, Understanding State Contribution Laws and Their Effect
on the Settlement of Mass Tort Actions, 73 T EX . L. REV . 1701, 1702 (1995)
(discussing various approaches to state contribution laws); Brittany L. Wills,
To Settle or Not to Settle?: The Calculation of Judgments Among Nonsettling
Defendants in Texas, 31 ST . MARY ’S L.J. 529, 536 (2000) (focusing on Texas
contribution laws).
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3. Checklist Item #16: Allow certain collateral sources to be
admissible so that jurors can consider and account for
all collateral sources that provided compensation to the
plaintiff for the alleged harm.
To further preserve resources for future claimants, trial courts
should dedicate “any amount paid by anybody, whether they be
joint tort-feasors or otherwise,” that have compensated a plaintiff
for the asbestos-related harm at issue.249 This calculation should
include collateral sources when a plaintiff’s initiative did not
generate the source of the funds.250 Generally, the collateral source
rules provide that damages awarded by a jury are not reduced by
the amount of compensation or benefits that the plaintiff received
from sources other than the defendant, even when the plaintiff did
not use his or her own assets to help create those sources of
funding.251 A North Carolina appellate court in Schenk v. HNA
Holdings, Inc.252 reviewed the impact of the collateral source rule
on modern asbestos litigation and affirmed a trial court’s decision
to offset plaintiffs’ verdict awards by amounts collected through
workers’ compensation benefits. 253 Given the mature state of
249

Schenk v. HNA Holdings, Inc., 613 S.E.2d 503, 509 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005) (internal citations omitted); see also Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W.
Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic
Perspective, 15 KAN . J.L. & PUB. POL ’ Y 57, 59 (2005)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2).
250
Where a plaintiff’s initiative generated the source of the funds, such as
by purchasing life insurance, it may not be appropriate for the court to allow
such evidence before a jury.
251
The collateral source rule “ordains that, in computing damages against a
tortfeasor, no reduction be allowed on account of benefits received by the plaintiff
from other sources, even though they have partially or wholly mitigated his
loss.” John Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort
Law, 54 CAL . L. R EV . 1478, 1478 (1966).
252
613 S.E.2d 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). For a more developed
discussion as to why collateral sources should be admitted in strict products
liability cases, see Victor Schwartz, Strict Liability and the Collateral Source
Rule Do Not Mix, 39 V AND. L. R EV . 569 (1986).
253
Id. at 510.
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asbestos litigation today, the Schenk Court provides an
appropriate method for preserving litigation resources.
Taking this step can be particularly important where joint and
several liability still applies, as jurors may want to spare
defendants from providing windfall benefits for harm they did not
cause. Such a system also allows juries to assist in rationing the
remaining litigation resources while still preventing those plaintiffs
from bearing the costs for their own bills.254
4. Checklist Item #17: Instruct jurors on the state’s joint and
several liability rules.
In asbestos litigation, dozens, even hundreds, of companies
may be named as potentially responsible parties, but most settle
and “usually only one or, at most, a couple of defendants remain”
at trial.255 These defendants likely are only peripherally related to
the alleged injury and named mostly for their “deep pockets.” To
help jurors accurately assess liability, courts should include in jury
instructions an explanation of the state’s joint and several liability
laws.256
When juries are not informed of the effect of joint and several
liability, they can be led to believe that a peripheral asbestos
254

Informing the jury in this manner recognizes the jurors’ fundamental role
as “the judge of the facts.” Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule and
the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REV . 523, 523 (1991); see also Whiteley v.
OKKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1983) (“The determination of
damages is traditionally a jury function. . . . The jury must have much
discretion to fix the damages deemed proper to fairly compensate the plaintiff.”).
255
Wasserman et al., supra note 67, at 917.
256
Joint and several liability holds a defendant responsible for an entire
harm, even though a jury has determined that it was only partially responsible.
“ The clear trend over the past several decades has been a move away from joint
and several liability.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 17 cmt. a (2000). As of this writing, about forty states have either
abolished or modified their joint liability rules. See Hantler et al., supra note
32, at 1147–51. Another approach to the one discussed in this section would be
for courts to abolish joint liability in asbestos cases altogether. See Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc
Public Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV . 203
(2004).
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defendant “will only be liable for a small contribution to the total
damage award and the main defendant will be liable for the
remainder.”257 Such “blindfold rules,”258 no matter how wellintended, may result in setting a “trap for the uninformed jury.”259
The jury will not know that the “deep pocket defendant may be
liable for the entire award, with little hope of contribution from the
party that is mainly at fault.”260 Concern about this issue in general
litigation has caused several state supreme courts to implement
“sunshine rules,” requiring trial courts to inform juries of joint and
several liability rules.261 These courts have found that it is “better
to equip jurors with knowledge of the effect of their findings than
to let them speculate in ignorance and thus subvert the whole
judicial process.”262 This concern about the ability of the judicial
system to competently adjudicate such claims is particularly
pressing in asbestos litigation, where the dynamics of the
peripheral defendant tend to dominate most cases.
For this reason, San Francisco Superior Court Judge Stephen
Allen Dombrink, provided such a jury instruction in response to a
defense motion.263 He instructed the jury that, under California
257

Julie K. Weaver, Jury Instructions on Joint and Several Liability in
Washington State, 67 W ASH . L. REV . 457, 471 (1992).
258
See generally Jordan H. Leibman et al., The Effects of Lifting the
Blindfold from Civil Juries Charged with Apportioning Damages in Modified
Comparative Fault Cases: An Empirical Study of the Alternatives, 35 AM.
BUS. L.J. 349 (1998).
259
Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal & Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61, 64 (Idaho
1987) (citing Seppi v. Betty, 579 P.2d 683 (Idaho 1978)).
260
Id.
261
See, e.g., Reese v. Werts Corp., 397 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1985) (holding
that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the effects of its verdict on
the plaintiff’s recovery); Decelles v. State, 795 P.2d 419, 419–21 (Mont. 1990)
(“We think Montana juries can and should be trusted with the information
about the consequences of their verdict.”); Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745
P.2d 883, 884, 886 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that statute provided that the court
must “inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict”).
262
Id.
263
See Horr v. Allied Packing, No. RG-03-104401, slip op. at *2 (Cal.
Super. Ct. App. Dep’t Feb. 13, 2006). The proposed order stated:
“If you find [Defendant] liable for any percentage of fault, [Defendant]
will be responsible to pay for its proportionate share of any non-
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law, any finding of a proportionate share of liability for economic
damages would result in the defendant being responsible for the full
amount of economic damages.264 Judge Dombrink had faith that
juries are responsible enough to handle this knowledge.265 A similar
instruction has recently been issued in Los Angeles County
Superior Court.266
5. Checklist Item #18: Sever or strike punitive damages
claims.
Finally, courts should sever or strike punitive damages claims
in asbestos cases because it is unsound public policy to allow such
awards in modern asbestos cases.267 The purpose of punitive
damages generally is to punish specific wrongdoers, deter them
from committing wrongful acts again, and deter others in similar
situations from committing wrongful behavior.268 The message of
economic damages you may award. With respect to economic damages,
[Defendant] will be responsible for the full amount of those damages
less a proportionate share of any settlements that may have been made
by other defendants.” Id.
264
Id. (approving the following jury instruction: “If you find Dentsply
liable for any percentage of fault, Dentsply will be responsible to pay for its
proportionate share of non-economic damages you may award. With respect to
economic damages, Dentsply will [be] responsible for the full amount of those
damages less a proportionate share of any settlements that may have been made
by other defendants.”).
265
See id. (“The proposed instruction will aid the jury in determining the
proper amount of damages and making the proper allocation of the ratio of
settlement percentages as between the economic and noneconomic damages.”).
266
See Reporter’s Daily Transcript of Proceedings, at 41, Mikul v. Bondex
Int’l, No. BC332247 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2006) (“If you
find a Defendant liable for any percentage of fault, that defendant will be
responsible to pay for its proportionate share of any noneconomic damages you
may award. With respect to economic damages, that defendant will be
responsible for the full amount of those damages, less a proportionate share of
any settlements that may have been made by other Defendants.”).
267
See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public
Policy Demands an End to the Hemorrhaging Effect of Punitive Damages in
Asbestos Cases, 6 T EX . R EV . L. & POL . 137 (2001).
268
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
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deterrence, both specific and general, has been heard loud and clear
in asbestos cases. At this phase in litigation, punitive damages have
an unintended and unfortunate effect—they “threaten fair
compensation to [pending and future] claimants” who await their
recovery, and “threaten . . . the economic viability of [peripheral]
defendants.”269 The problem is exacerbated when punitive damages
are repeatedly assessed against a company in different trials for the
same or similar underlying conduct.270
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
approved a decision by Judge Weiner, who oversaw the federal
multi-district litigation for asbestos cases, to sever all punitive
damages claims from federal asbestos cases before remanding
compensatory damages cases for trial.271 The Third Circuit, quoting
liberally from a 1991 Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Asbestos Litigation, said that its decision was based
on “compelling” public policy:
Although there may be grounds to support an award,
multiple judgments for punitive damages in the mass tort
context against a finite number of defendants with limited
assets threaten fair compensation to pending claimants and
future claimants who await their recovery, and threaten the
economic viability of the defendants. To the extent that
some states do not [sic] permit punitive damages, such
awards can be viewed as a malapportionment of a limited
fund. Meritorious claims may go uncompensated while
earlier claimants enjoy a windfall unrelated to their actual
damages.272
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Third Circuit strongly urged
state courts to sever or stay punitive damages claims in asbestos

(2003).
269

JUD. C ONF. REP ., supra note 11, at 3, 5.
See William W. Schwarzer, Punishment Ad Absurdum, 11 CAL. LAW
116 (1991) (“Barring successive punitive damage awards against a defendant for
the same conduct would remove the major obstacle to settlement of mass tort
litigation and open the way for the prompt resolution” of legitimate claims.”).
271
In re Collins,233 F.3d 809, 812 (3d Cir. 2000).
272
Id.
270
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cases to preserve assets for sick claimants.273 Several state courts
have done so, including trial courts in Baltimore City; 274
Northampton County (Bethlehem and Easton), Pennsylvania;
Philadelphia;275 and New York City. 276 Florida has enacted a law
banning punitive damages “in any civil action alleging an asbestos
or silica claim.”277
Trial courts should follow these examples and sever punitive
damages in order to preserve funds to compensate the truly sick.
This step should be taken in the early stages of litigation because of
the leveraging effect punitive damages have at the settlement
table.278
CONCLUSION
The foregoing checklist items were born in jurisdictions where
the asbestos litigation crisis is most prolific and best understood.
The common theme is that they facilitate the resolution of claims
on their merits. Specifically, they focus scarce litigation resources
on the claims of those truly impaired from asbestos exposure,
allow defendants to exculpate themselves when they or their
273

See id. (“It is discouraging that . . . some state courts allow punitive
damages in asbestos cases. The continued hemorrhaging of available funds
deprives current and future victims of rightful compensation.”).
274
See Keene Corp. v. Levin, 623 A.2d 662, 663 (Md. 1993) (noting that
trial court deferred payments of punitive damages “until all Baltimore City
plaintiffs’ compensatory damages are paid”).
275
See Third Circuit Rehears Dunn Arguments en banc, 8:1 MEALEY ’S
LITIG . REP.: ASBESTOS 20 (Feb. 5, 1993) (“[The] Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas has a basic ‘standing order’ that all punitives are to be
stayed . . . .”).
276
See $64.65 Million Awarded in Four Asbestos Cases, 4:18 MEALEY ’S
LITIG . REP.: T OXIC T ORTS 16 (Dec. 15, 1995) (reporting on a New York case
in which the trial court severed and deferred punitive damages indefinitely).
277
FLA . S TAT . A NN. § 774.207(1) (West 2005).
278
See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1398 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he potential for punitive awards is a weighty factor in
settlement negotiations, . . . [and] assets that could be available for satisfaction
of future compensatory claims are dissipated”), modified in part, 13 F.3d 58 (3d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1031 (1993).
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products could not have caused the harm alleged, cut down on the
gaming of the legal system, and preserve assets for future
claimants. To employ these checklist items most effectively, courts
should require plaintiffs early in their lawsuits to provide facts
relating to the nature of their damages and to each defendant. By
separating out the colorable claims as soon as practicable, the
nation’s judges can maintain the current momentum towards
restoring order and sound public policy to asbestos cases.

